

A N
INTRODUCTION
T O
Moral Philosophy.

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*Socratem illum solitum aiunt dicere, perfectum sibi
opus esse, si quis satis esset concitatus cohortatione
suâ ad studium cognoscendæ percipiendæque vir-
tutis; quibus enim id persuasum esset, ut nihil
mallent se esse, quam bonos viros, iis reliquam fa-
cilem esse doctrinam. Cic. de Orat. L. 1. §. 204.*

O X F O R D,

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THE P R E F A C E.

Although there is no great merit in compiling a Compendium of any Science, no great praise either of Invention or Erudition to be obtained thereby, yet the usefulness of such little works is not to be denied: For they give the young Student a general view of the subject, which is recommended to his consideration, and serve something of the same purpose as the Landscape of a Country to an unexperienced Traveller.

In this view, the young Adventurer into the extensive and important Science of Morality will kindly accept my offering Him some previous, though but superficial, knowledge of it, and of the relation which its several parts bear to each other. He is not to expect any thing here suggested by way of refinement or going beyond the plain obvious appearances of things, but such as may be supposed to lie within the apprehension of Common Sense, as distinguished from superiour capacity and improvement: For indeed it would be preposterous to direct him to the abstruse difficulties of this or any other Science, before he is supposed to have master'd the first principles of it. And as this subject has not exercised the attention of serious and good men in any Country, I believe,

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more successfully than in our own, I have made no scruple of borrowing any assistance that chanc'd to fall in my way, not only as to sentiment, but even expression: At the same time I have taken the liberty of making great alterations in what I have borrowed, in order to accommodate it to my purpose; so that a reference to the pages (did I recollect them) could answer no other end, but that of gratifying the curiosity of some persons, and thereby perhaps of exposing myself to the censure of disguising and maiming a good Author. --- And as I am so little concerned in the invention of what is offered in the following Introduction, I may venture to say that a great part of it is worth considering. Whether it is put together in such a manner as will answer any useful purpose, is another Question.

It would however be an unpardonable omission not to acknowledge myself greatly beholden to the Sermons and Analogy of Dr Butler, the present Lord Bishop of BRISTOL, or not to recommend them to the studious Reader, when he shall have master'd the common evidence which is usually offer'd in support of Morality in general, and of Christianity in particular. --- It is true, that those excellent Books contain many things well suited to general apprehension, and very useful to settle our notions of morality upon a rational bottom, and to lead us from thence to the acknowledgment of such doctrines as are properly Christian; several of which I have inserted in the following Introduction. But it is no less certain, that those performances, being the produce of mature thought, extensive observation, and
strong

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strong penetration in the Writer, must require some share of each in the Reader. 'Tis therefore no wonder if They, to whom his Lordship does not address himself, --- if Novices in thinking, at one time complain of the Reflections and Reasonings as abstruse, at another affect to despise them for being trite and obvious. In the meanwhile the judicious Reader will see enough to convince him, that in the former case the blame ought to revert upon the Censurer's own inattention and unacquaintance with the circumstances of human nature; and as to the latter, --- He will be apt to think, that nothing ought to be despis'd as trite or trifling, which can be rendered subservient to the noble purposes of effectually invalidating objections, removing difficulties, and of satisfying many of the doubts which are apt to attend and disquiet thoughtful minds in their Religious and Moral Speculations: --- He will observe with pleasure how surprizingly the truths made known by the Christian Revelation harmonize with the Constitution of things in the Natural World; Nor can He easily fail of improving his heart, as well as understanding, by that rich vein of Piety and Goodness, which glow throughout the whole performances; and which being all along supported by solid argument, will bear pressing home upon the thought, without giving distaste to the coolest Reasoner.

I have had a general regard to the Plan usually received in the Schools, because I think it the most commodious; and because the new, and seemingly more scientific, method attended with all the Mathematical formalities of Definitions, Postulatus,

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stulatums, Axioms, Lemmas, Theorems, and Corollaries (all very astonishing to a young Reader) seems to me forced and affected upon this subject; and not so likely to answer the good purpose of clearing up any doubtful proposition, as to perplex Him in the apprehension of those that are confessedly true.

Many of the Scholastick terms of Art and Distinction I have discarded: For indeed they are but the husks of Science and ought to be pared off, if there is danger of their giving disrelish to the fruit itself. At the same time I have retained the meaning of several of them; so that they, who are desirous of an acquaintance with them, may by comparing these chapters with the parallel ones of some Latin Compendium perhaps be better enabled to understand their signification. --- And it must be confessed that such acquaintance is very useful to those, whose studies are likely to carry them into the reading of philosophical treatises and moral discourses; where it is very common to find modes of speech evidently borrowed from the Language of the Schools.

As the reason of my undertaking this Compendium was to remedy some of the inconveniences which I seem'd to observe in those already publish'd; so I chose to do it in English, upon this principle, that the Rudiments of any Art or Science ought to be render'd as easy and familiar as possible. I suppose that the custom of giving young beginners their Introduction to Philosophy in the Latin tongue has been continued more out of necessity, more out of want of proper books in English, than from the design of preserving or improving

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proving their skill in Latin; which purpose all must agree is best answered by Classical writers. And therefore I should think it adviseable for those, who have not confirmed their taste in elegant writing, to cultivate only an occasional acquaintance with such authors among the moderns as have delivered their philosophical sentiments in Latin, namely, to supply themselves with proper Definitions and Distinctions to be used in their Disputations. --- Or, if their improvement in Latin is thought requisite to be carried on jointly with that of Philosophical Knowledge, the Reader will do well to view in Tully's Offices his elegant and masterly draught of most of the social or civil virtues. --- Nor would even Aristotle's account of these matters, if taken immediately from himself, fail to bring with it a sufficient degree of entertainment and improvement to the young Student. --- This he will do as a Scholar. --- But as a Moral Agent (*i. e.* as a person sincerely desirous to secure his main happiness) it will be requisite for him to examine what the Holy Scripture has declared upon each article: and for this purpose it may be adviseable for him as he goes along to turn to the parallel heads in Bishop Gastrel's Christian Institutes; a book which I suppose, or which at least deserves, to be in every one's hand.

At the end, I have subjoined two Tables. The First is a reference to such English Discourses or Sermons upon Moral Subjects as have fallen within my notice since the taking of this task in hand. For I doubt not but that well disposed persons would now and then be glad to assist their
medi-

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meditations upon moral subjects, if they knew where such assistance might be met with: and I have cited a greater variety of Authors than perhaps was necessary, that the Reader might have the better chance of being able to furnish himself with a discourse upon the subject required.

The Second Table is of several of the principal Writers in Moral Philosophy. They are named in such order as to give a little sketch of the History of this branch of Science.



Erratum.

P. 15. l. 19. *for* Rea *read* Reason.

A N
INTRODUCTION
T O
Moral Philosophy.

CHAP. I.

THE word *Philosophy* is a general *Philosophy*, name comprehending all the Liberal Arts and Sciences. Some of these are *instrumental*, and design'd only to *instrumental* facilitate our entrance upon the more valuable^{sal} and important branches of knowledge, such as *Grammar*, *Logick*, &c. Of the *principal*^{principal} branches some are of a *speculative* nature, as *speculative*, *Metaphysicks*, *Natural Philosophy*, *Mathematics*, &c. or, if any parts of these are sometimes called *practical*, this is only as they are applied to render us more skilful in certain operations. Another branch of Philosophy is term'd *practical* in a more proper sense, as it *practical* has a direct reference to Human Actions, points out our duty, and regulates our conduct, that we may become better Men.

A

The

Our Duty
whence
learns.

The nature of our Duty with the reason of its obligation may in ordinary cases be learnt from considering the nature of man, and the circumstances in which he is placed.

Ethicks.

Some duties there are, to the performance of which All men, as far as they have opportunity or ability, are equally obliged; and these are the proper object of *Ethicks* or Moral Philosophy.

Politicks.

Others result from the relation, which a man bears to a Civil Society, whether as Sovereign, Magistrate or Subject, and are considered in a distinct Science called *Politicks*.

*Oecono-
micks.*

And a third sort concern a man no further than as he is either at the head, or is a part of a particular Family; and are treated of in *Oeconomicks*.

*Politicks
and Oeco-
nomicks
how com-
monly un-
derstood.*

It ought to be observed, that tho' the words *Politicks* and *Oeconomicks* are usually understood to relate to such rules or maxims of prudential conduct as have a tendency to promote the temporal prosperity of *Civil Communities* and *Families*, (in which view they make no part of Moral Philosophy) yet the reciprocal duties of Sovereign and Subject, Master and Servant, Husband and Wife, Parent and Child, and of Kinsmen towards each other in their several degrees, are all of them parts, and very material ones too, of our Moral Conduct.

duct. The performance or neglect of them renders us proper objects of praise or dis-
 praise; the happiness of life is greatly in-
 terested in the due observance of them; and
 their obligation might be deduced from the
 nature of man and his circumstances in these
 relations of life; and therefore in a compleat
 system of Ethicks they ought to be treated
 of distinctly. However, at the present I shall
 confine my self to the general plan upon which
 observations upon this subject have common-
 ly been methodised.

CHAP. II.

ETHICKS have usually been defined the *Art* Ethicks.
of living well, or, of living virtuously,
 and that, in order to become happy.

Whoever reflects upon the conduct of him-
 self or other men must observe, that, what-
 ever action he deliberately performs or at-
 tempts is done in prospect of some *End*, some
 pleasure or satisfaction, whether real or ima-
 ginary, near or remote, great or small. No-
 thing can set us at work but the prospect of
 some end to be attain'd thereby, something
 that is supposed likely to better our condi-
 tion, or to render our continuance in it more
 easy and pleasant. That which tends to pre-
 serve to us the continuance of our Being or

Good,
Evil.

Good the
general ob-
ject of pur-
suit.

Evil of a-
version.

These of
different
kinds.

- proper to
a vegetable.

- animals.

- men.

The forego-
ing all tru-
ly good, but
subordinate
to each o-
ther.

to render it more comfortable, delightful, &c. is called *Good*; *Evil* the contrary. Hence

Good is defined to be the general object of Desire, Evil of Aversion. And the various and contrary choices that men make in the world do not argue that they do not all pursue

Good; but that the same thing is not Good to every man alike, or does not appear so.

In some men the seeds of virtue and goodness are almost suffocated by their concern for the preservation of the vegetable part of them:

if they receive their nutriment, are secured from the injuries of the seasons, grow up to a state of maturity and propagate their kind,

they trouble themselves no further: Others are raised to the pursuit of something beyond, and lay in their claim to the enjoyment of such things as are grateful to their Appetites

and senses: and lastly, Others actuated by a sense of dignity in their natures, seek their Good and find satisfaction in the exercise of Piety, Temperance, Justice and Charity. The first is the Good of a *Vegetable*, the second of an *Animal*, the last of a *Moral Agent*.

As man partakes of a vegetable and animal nature, so doubtless whatever is Good to a vegetable or animal must be so to him: But on the other hand, as he is partaker of a nature altogether different in kind, more noble

noble, and more properly the *self* within us that has a perception of Good or Evil, hither ought our regards principally to be directed. It is a duty that we owe our selves to endeavour to advance the welfare of all that makes part of our selves; But for the same reason it is wrong to misplace our main concern upon that in which our main interest cannot be conceived to lie. If the Rational part of us be really the more noble and interesting, ^{Summum Bonum. Ultimate End.} hither ought we to bend our endeavours, this ought to be regarded as our *Summum Bonum*, our Ultimate End; and every other excellency or advantage should be desired and pursued only in subordination to this, as *Means Means* to an *End*, as an Instrument put into our hands by the Author of our Nature in order to work out our real and best happiness.

Although it appears from the history of ^{whether there be an ultimate end to man. Different pursuits of different men no objection.} Mankind, that an infinite number of objects have been pointed out to the view and pursued under this notion, and though there is no satisfaction to be found in any thing without satiety, this ought not to be admitted as an argument that there is in reality no object commensurate to our desires and expectations; It only proves that the present state of things, however well adapted to give delight and pleasure to Vegetables and Animals

*Ultimate
end of man
not to be ex-
pected in
this life.
Probable
arguments
of a future
state.*

mals as far as they are capable of receiving it, is not so with regard to the whole nature of Man.

Man is the only Being on earth that has any apprehension of a future State ; he has a secret longing after it and a dread of annihilation ; his circumstances in the world are such as might have been expected upon supposition that he was to be placed in a state of Tryal as a Candidate for future happiness ; he has Reason and Knowledge and Faculties superiour to the business of this present world ; and therefore we may reasonably admit these considerations as a strong presumption that he is really in a state of Tryal and Discipline, and that his Faculties have a respect to somewhat further and beyond this world. Nor can any shadow of a reason be assigned, why Almighty God, who at first gave us our Being, who has shed forth in such variety the influence of his Goodness, why, I say, He may not answer these reasonable expectations, the Hopes and Fears of his Creatures, and reward or punish them according as they have employed the time, which he has allotted them in this life, and the means of bettering themselves and their condition, with which he has furnished them.

The

The attention of mankind, where Religion is out of the case, is chiefly directed either *first*, towards procuring a sufficiency of possessions for the answering their necessities; or *secondly*, towards the delight and satisfaction to be received in certain enjoyments, by their use and suitability; or *thirdly*, towards the esteem of good men, whereby they are render'd acceptable and useful to others; which esteem must be understood to include the esteem and approbation of our own minds in a sense of decency and dignity and moral improvement.

These considerations have given rise to one of the divisions of Good, into *Profit*, *Pleasure*, and *Honour*. Another is often made use of with reference to the *Mind*, *Body*, and *Fortune*: Of the first kind are good parts, *strength of memory, wisdom, contentment, &c.* of the second, *soundness of constitution, health, beauty, &c.* of the last, *riches, liberty, honour, &c.*

I need barely mention that the "lessening or escaping of Evil is to be reckon'd under the notion of Good, and *vice versa*." "The greater Good is to be preferr'd before the less, and the lesser Evil to be endured rather than the greater."

"A pre-

“ A present Good may be parted with, upon a probable expectation of a future Good which is more excellent.

“ A present Evil is to be endured for the avoiding of a probable future Evil which is far greater --- and in both these cases in proportion to the greatness of the Evil to be avoided, or Good to be obtained.

CHAP. III.

Parts of Human Nature.

HUMAN Nature is not one simple uniform thing, but a composition of various parts, appetites, affections and passions.

The close union between them.

The two principal parts of it are the *Soul* and *Body*. Altho' these two are entirely different from each other in their natures, yet their union is inconceivably close and intimate; they mutually affect each other, and (whatever be the case of separate spirits) in our present state the *Body* is a necessary instrument of perception to the *Soul*.

Faculties of the Soul, Understanding,

The principal faculties of the *Soul* are the *Understanding* and the *Will*. The *Understanding* is that Faculty or Power, whereby we perceive ideas or notions in our minds and the agreement or disagreement that is between them. The *Will* is that Power, which the *Soul* has within itself barely by a thought to begin or forbear, to continue or end several

Will.

ral

ral of its own actions, and motions of the Body.

Whatever action is deliberately enter'd upon, whatever end we pursue, we may generally be able to distinguish in it several acts of the Understanding, and the Will, exerted in the following order.

The Understanding furnishes us with the notice of the *End*, which we propose to ourselves: It likewise informs us whether or how far it seems likely to be advantageous or prejudicial to us.

Now every prospect of advantage naturally raiseth in the mind a secret *Desire* or inclination, which hath been called *Velleity*; Not that our Desire is always proportioned to the known value of things. For if we see that it does not belong to our condition of Being, or lie within the sphere of our attainment, we suspend our Desire after it, and rest satisfied without it. But if the advantage appears not only to be considerable in it self, but also likely to be obtained, the Will upon such representation of the Understanding can scarce fail of giving it the *actual preference* of a complete choice, which hath been called *Volition*. (The same is the case of a lesser evil, when it appears necessary in order to avoid a greater.)

B

Upon

What several acts of the Understanding & Will are distinguishable in the prosecution of good. Their order. 1. Judicium absolutum.

2. Velleitas.

3. Judicium comparatum.

4. Volitio.

An Introduction

5 Delibera-
tio. Upon this determination of the Will to-
wards any particular object, the Understan-
ding is exerted in order to *discover* the *Means*
6 Electio. requisite to obtain it, and out of several which
offer themselves, to *select* the more proper.

7 Consen-
sus. But still it depends upon the Will what use
8 Usus. to make of those Means, which are approved
of by the Understanding; as indeed it also
doth, what degree of attention to bestow up-
on the consideration either of the End it self,
or the Means requisite to obtain it.

9 Fruitio. To the Will likewise is usually ascribed the
pleasure and satisfaction taken in the *Enjoy-*
ment of any End acquired.

*Whether
the Will be
free.*

Libertas
contrarie-
tatis, seu
specifica-
tionis.
Lib. contra-
dictionis,
seu exer-
citi.

Judicium
ultimum
intellectus
practici.

Without entering into any of the intricate
disputes which have been started concerning
the freedom of the human Will, thus much
is certain: In most cases we are not at liber-
ty to forbear the Act of Desire, (or *Velleity*;) but in actual and *determined Choosing*, (or *Vo-*
lition;) especially where the Good is at all re-
mote, we are. Here we may suspend the act
of our choice from being determined for or
against the thing proposed, till we have exa-
mined whether it be really of a nature in it
self and in its consequences likely to make us
happy or no. The Will is indeed always de-
termined by that which upon the final result
of consideration is judged Good by the Under-
standing;

standing; but if by too hasty a choice of our own making we have imposed upon our selves wrong measures of Good and Evil, the miscarriages, which follow on it, must be imputed to our own Election: And indeed for this reason Freedom was given us that we might examine and take care of our own Happiness, and look that we be not deceived.

Why we were made Free-A-gents.

CHAP. IV.

THE *Human Body* is so constituted as to receive impressions upon it from external objects. These impressions are made according to those several ways in which objects affect us, and that, whether we will or no: It being not in our power in many cases whether we will receive them or no, or in what manner we will receive them: thus light and colours affect us by the *Eyes*; sound by the *Ears*; tastes by the *Palate*; smells by the *Nose*; heat and cold, hardness and softness, &c. by the *Touch*. Sensation is that perception of the Soul, which actually accompanies such impressions; and if either the organs of Sense, or the nerves, which are the immediate instruments whereby the Soul is affected, are any of them so disordered, as not to perform their functions, the objects have

We are passive in our sensations.

Five Senses.

The senses are only instruments of perception.

but necessary ones.

no way to bring themselves into view, and be perceived by the Understanding.

*Fitted to
our state.*

These Senses are fitted by the infinitely wise Contriver of our Being to our state and condition in the world: By them we are able to know and distinguish things so far, as to apply them to our uses. But in order to prompt us to make an actual provision for the conveniences of living, He has implanted in us certain inward Feelings, a variety of Appetites, Affections and Passions, which serve as so many springs of action, both putting us upon and helping to carry us thro' a course of behaviour suitable to our condition.

*Ideas of the
Passions
whence
form'd.*

The ideas of our Appetites, Affections and Passions are best formed by reflecting on what we feel within our selves; where we shall find that several of our Sensations are accompanied with Pleasure and Pain, from the various operations of Good and Evil, as they are differently applied to, or considered by us.

*Sensations
generally
attended
with plea-
sure and
pain.*

Though their perceptions are daily felt and spoken of, yet it is not always easy in words to ascertain what their ideas are, or to distinguish them from each other; from whence it comes to pass that treatises concerning them seldom stand clear of the charge of abstruseness. The word *Appetite* seems properly to denote some bodily desire; thus the Appetite of

of *Hunger* operates insensibly upon us to use the recruits of food as the necessary means of our preservation : It is used figuratively, when we speak of an appetite for fame, a thirst after glory. *Affection* is a general word applicable both to *Appetites*, and those other commotions of our Nature which are called *Passions*, especially the milder sort of them. It is also used for those active principles within us, which are sometimes called *Instincts*, such as the natural affection of Parents towards their Offspring.

The Passions most usually taken notice of, are the following,

Love arises from the Delight, which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in us.

Hatred is the thought of the Pain, which any thing present or absent is apt to produce in us.

Desire is the uneasiness a Man finds in himself upon the Absence of any thing, whose present enjoyment carries the idea of Delight with it.

Joy is a Delight of the Soul, from the consideration of the Present or assured Approaching possession of any Good.

Sorrow is an uneasiness in the Soul upon the thought of a Good Lost, which might have

have been enjoyed longer; or, the sense of a Present Evil.

Hope,

Hope is the pleasure in the Soul upon the prospect of a Probable enjoyment of any thing which is apt to delight us.

Fear,

Fear is an uneasiness of the Soul upon the Apprehension of a Future Evil likely to befall us.

Despair,

Despair is the thought of the Unattainableness of any Good.

Anger.

Anger is a Commotion and discomposure of the Soul upon the receipt of any injury with a present purpose of making the aggressor sensible of our Resentment.

Number of the passions not easily ascertained. Some simple, others mixed.

Besides the foregoing there are many more; some of which will be touch'd upon when I mention the particular Virtues. And they are scarce any of them in life and practice simple and alone and wholly unmixed with others: tho' in discourse and conversation that usually carries the name which appears most in the present state of the Mind.

Passions affect the body as well as mind.

It is observable that our passions, most of them, in most persons, operate strongly on the Body, and cause various changes in it; thus, Shame is apt to cause blushing; Anger and Fear, paleness and trembling; Sorrow, tears.

Passions very useful, and even

The Passions are of admirable use in life and tend many times to noble ends. Our inward

ward frame, of which they make a considerable part, does in a particular manner answer ^{necessary to our present condition.} to the external condition and circumstances of life in which we are placed; and will afford, to such as will but be attentive, certain instances of a final cause. They lead us to a determinate course of action suitable to our condition; they shew us what course of life we are made for, and what is our duty, and in a peculiar manner enforce upon us the practice of it. The Passions therefore are not to be considered as mere infirmities. They *primarily* and most *directly* lead to a right behaviour. Some of them are of that nature that *irascible*, without them we could not well subsist, being placed within us as guards and a security to our interests: Others of them seem intended to quicken our search after the necessities and conveniences of living, for which meer Reason would scarce make a due provision. If pleasure were wholly separated from all outward sensations and inward thoughts, we should have no reason to prefer one thought or motion before another, negligence to attention, or motion to rest, and so we should neither move our bodies, nor employ our minds. ^{Concupiscible.}

It must be confessed however, that *secondarily* and *more remotely* they lead us into what ^{Passions necessary to be kept under, why?} is evil, and that they are so very apt to grow upon

upon us, especially with regard to objects of sense, if they are not kept under exact discipline, that they ought to be watched and well examined. If Reason is on their side, or stands neuter, they *may* be heard: In other cases we *must* be deaf to their applications, and strongly guard against their emotions. In this view the occasional denial of such inclinations as in themselves are lawful, may be found expedient, in order to keep temptations at a proper distance; it may be of great use in curing our defects or at least in preventing the ill consequences of them.

*Self-denial
why useful?*

*Exercise of
our Passions
how to
be qualified.*

We shall rightly qualify the exercise of our Passions, and the natural expressions of them, by taking care, 1. that they be not disproportionate to the *occasion* or *object*.

2. --- not unfitting for the *manner*, or *season*.

3. --- not immoderate in the *degree*.

*Why some
Passions
are said to
be vicious
in their very
nature,*

Hence appears the reason why some Passions are spoken of as vicious and immoral in their very nature; namely, because some of them taken with their special objects and degrees have obtained peculiar names, such as *Pride*, *Envy*, *Revenge*, &c. all which words import something irregular in both those respects. And so on the other hand, the same words, which signify some Passions, signify likewise

others virtuous.

likewise the virtues which are to regulate them, such as *Compassion*, *Goodwill*; which are therefore said to be virtuous passions.

In considering our Passions we should distinguish between that *general* desire of our own Happiness, which is found in every man, and is properly Self-love, and our various *particular* affections, passions and appetites to particular things. The object of the former is somewhat *internal*, our own happiness, enjoyment and satisfaction, whether we have or have not a distinct particular perception what it is or wherein it consists: The object of the latter is this or that particular *external* thing, which the affections tend towards, and of which we have always a particular idea or perception: thus, Riches are the object of avarice; Honour of ambition, &c. Self-love never seeks any thing external for the sake of the thing, but only as a means of Happiness or Good: Particular affections rest in the external things themselves. And thus, Virtue may be said to be desirable upon its own account, we having within us undeniably an affection towards and an approbation of Virtue as eligible in and for it self, as we also have a general abhorrence of what is base and vicious.

It should be further observed, that as Man may be considered in two capacities, the *Pri-*

Affections, some private, others social.
These latter called Humanity. Why?
Private & social Affections not inconsistent with each other. Both of 'em instrumental to the general happiness of Mankind.
In what respect they interfere.

vate and Social, as being designed not only to pursue his own interest, but likewise to contribute to the good of others, so, some of our affections in their primary intention and design seem to belong to the single or private, others to the publick or social capacity, and are directed in particular courses by several regards to Family, Friends, Neighbourhood, the Distressed, our Country. The Affections relating hereunto are called by the general name *Humanity*, because they peculiarly become the condition in which we are placed, that of a natural and necessary dependance upon each

other. Between the private and social Affections there is really no contrariety, but they perfectly coincide and mutually carry on each other: The greatest satisfaction to Our selves depends upon our having the latter in a due degree; and the former is one chief security of our right behaviour towards Society: And their mutual coinciding, so that we can scarce promote the one without the other, is equally a proof, that we were made for both. That seeming competition, which appears sometimes to lie between Benevolence and Private interest, relates not so much to the enjoyment it self, as to the materials and means of enjoyment, which the most abandoned would chuse to obtain by innocent methods, if they were as easy

easy and effectual to their End. Men follow ^{Men act no less in con-} or obey their Nature in both these respects, ^{tradition} in a certain degree, but not intirely: As they ^{to their Private, than Social happiness.} neglect the duties which they owe their fellow Creatures, to which their Nature leads them, and contrary to the dictates of Nature shew themselves unjust, oppressive, treacherous and ungrateful, in order to gratify more effectually their eager desire after equality and superiority, or such and such external goods, so, there is in men a manifest negligence of their own real happiness and interest in the present world, when that interest is inconsistent with a present gratification; for the sake of which they negligently, nay even knowingly, become the Authors and Instruments of their own ruin.

CHAP. V.

WHEN we speak of *Human Actions* (^{Human actions what?} under which word is comprehended the *forbearance* of any action) we mean such as flow directly from the principles which distinguish Man from Brute, namely, those belonging to our Rational part, our *Understanding* and *Will*. When any Action is performed in ^{when voluntary,} consequence of the order and command of the Mind it is said to be *voluntary*, and becomes *imputable* to a Man, that is, placed to *imputable*.

his account as the proper Author of it. Now
when invol- the Mind cannot be properly said to order
untary. and command an action, unless it both per-
 ceives the nature of it, and unless the doing
 or not doing of it depends upon the deter-
 mination of the Mind. The action of a Ten-
 nis-ball by the stroke of the Racket is invo-
 luntary with regard to the ball, which has nei-
 ther the power of perception or volition; but
 it is voluntary with respect to the Striker, who
 has *both*. The action of a man striking him-
 self or his friend by a Convulsive motion of
 his arm is likewise involuntary, for want of
 the *latter*.

Actions
voluntary
mediately
or imme-
diately.

Actions are considered as *voluntary*, and
 (which is a consequence thereof) liable to
 punishment and censure, tho' the preference
 given by the mind does not immediately re-
 gard the actions themselves, but something
 that has a direct tendency to produce them.
 Thus, men are blamed for having brought
 diseases upon themselves, tho' their Will has
 been exercised only with regard to the true
cause of the disease, viz. intemperate eating
 and drinking.

Necessary
Agents.

Agents that have no Thought, no Volition,
 are in every thing *necessary* Agents, that is, in
 a moral view no Agents at all.

There

There is scarce any action of importance, ^{Mixt A-} which men perform, but what is attended ^{tions.} with a mixture of good and evil, pleasure and pain. No man desires evil or pain for its own sake, and therefore so far the action becomes *involuntary*: But in order to secure a more valuable good, or to avoid a greater future evil or pain, men part with a present good, and submit to a present evil with the utmost readiness. Thus, men every day undergo severe operations in Chirurgery; they value not the pains of the Body from want, disease, or outward injuries in prospect of that happiness, which Virtue, Piety and Religion lead unto.

Where there is no perception there can ^{Actions} properly speaking be no preference: and con- ^{perform'd} frequently such actions as are performed thro' ^{thro' igno-} mere ignorance are in themselves involuntary. ^{rance how} ^{far Volun-} ^{tary.}

But then it should be remember'd, that Ignorance is sometimes owing to an abuse of our natural faculties; sometimes to negligence and inattention in not duly considering things in their nature and consequences: Both which kinds of misconduct make us answerable for the miscarriages which follow. Thus, Anger, and Drunkenness so far cloud and disorder the Understanding, as to hurry men on to Murder &c. contrary to the judgment of their cooler

cooler thoughts. But inasmuch as a proper degree of care might have stifled or at least controlled the one and prevented the other, the Murderer is justly subjected to punishment as a *voluntary* agent.

Ignoran-
tia Juris,
Facti.

Ignorance sometimes respects the *Rule* of Action, sometimes the *Action* itself and its circumstances; which being in some cases very numerous and perplexing, Errors in Judgment arising from thence are frequently excused.

*Ignorance
of Law why
not admit-
ted as an
excuse?*

Ignorance of *Law*, or of the *Rule* of Action, is rarely, if ever, admitted as an excuse: for the *general rules* of morality lie so obvious to the human understanding, that nothing but a very criminal neglect or indolence can prevent their being perceived: And as for *particular Laws*, every wise Legislator hath proper methods of promulging them and bringing them within the subject's notice; after which it is at their own peril if they continue ignorant.

*Vincible
ignorance.*

In either case, if the Ignorance be *vincible*, i. e. if it be owing to our not making a proper use of those means of knowing better wherewith the providence of God hath furnished us, it becomes criminal and punishable, and that in proportion to the dignity and importance of the matter, which ought to have engaged our attentive consideration.

Invin-

Invincible ignorance, or that which it was *Invincible* not in our power to have avoided, will no *ignorance.* doubt be admitted as an excuse by every just Judge: No commands, whether Human or Divine, however general, can be supposed to extend to such persons, as are under a natu-^{absolutely} ral incapacity of obeying them: And we also^{so,} humbly hope for the forgiveness of such ignorances, as may arise either from the infir-^{morally so.} mity of our nature, or from the disadvantageous circumstances of life in which we are placed, and not from presumptuous carelessness and inattention.

I must not conclude this chapter without *Habits* observing, as matter of certain experience, *what:* and of great importance, that by voluntary actions, especially if often repeated, we get an aptness, a facility, readiness and often a pleasure in them, before we are aware. Our Nature is formed to yield to use and exer-^{how form-} ed. cise: thereby the inclinations which render'd us averse to a course of action grow weaker; the difficulties in it, not only the imaginary, but the real ones, lessen; the reasons for it offer themselves of course to our thoughts on all occasions; and the contrary principles, by being accustomed to submit, come at length to do so of course: And thus by repeated acts, and momentary impressions frequently made

Habits how formed. made upon us, settled alterations in our tempers and characters are introduced imperceptibly; and *Habits* are formed, which, when confirmed, grow as it were into a second Nature. Thus, several *bodily* Activities and Motions, whether graceful or unbecoming, are owing to Use: so again, as to the *Mind*, general habits of Life and Conduct, such as those of Obedience and Submission to Authority; those of Veracity, Temperance, Justice and Charity; those of Attention and Industry, are produced by exercise and discipline, as their contraries are likewise by acts of indulgence and licentiousness. We do not know indeed how far it is *possible* in the nature of things, that effects should be wrought in us at once, equivalent to what is produced by use and exercise; but by the appointment of Providence, in ordinary cases at least, this latter is the way of forming within our selves Habits of action.

CHAP. VI.

*Morality of
Actions
supposes
some Rule.*

THE *Morality* of mens voluntary actions implies a relation to some rule, whereby their rectitude or obliquity is examined; the former rendring them a proper subject of praise and reward, the latter of censure and punishment.

Right

We know so little of the scheme of God's ^{Divine A-} government either natural or moral, that it ^{ctions, whe-} must be presumption in us so say, what it was ^{ther subject} that determined Almighty God to form the ^{to Rule.} Universe as He has done, or to order the present course of his Providence. A *Fitness* in ^{Natural} the nature of things no doubt there is (i.e. the ^{fitness in} Means made use of by God are very fit and ^{what sense} proper) to answer the Divine end and intention: And, as this Fitness is fully known to Him, and He has no superiour, it may be called the Rule of the Divine Conduct --- with as much propriety, as any such term can be applied to a Being, who transcends our largest conceptions; and concerning whose conduct it is but a decent piece of prudence to speak and reason with the utmost caution and reverence.

But with regard to *Man*, his adequate rule ^{Will of God} of action is the Will of God, howsoever made ^{the rule of} known: The very condition of our nature sub- ^{human a-} jects our conduct to a strict conformity to His ^{ctions,} direction, nor is it possible for us to disengage ^{Why?} our selves from the Obligation to follow it.

In ordinary cases the apparent fitness of ^{Law of} things, as manifested by the light of natural ^{Nature} reason, is a presumptive proof, the best and ^{what?} only proof which we have, that this or that course of Action is agreeable to the Divine Will. This is called the *Law of Nature*.

D

But

*Law of
Revelation
to be atten-
ded to.*

Why?

*Conscience
what?*

*In several
Acts.*

*Moral
Sense.*

But supposing GOD to make any external revelation of His Will, --- this must raise in every serious mind a sense of duty and security in following it; and of sin and danger in deviating from it. We are imperfect Beings; it therefore is fit and reasonable to take infinite Wisdom for our Guide: We are dependent Creatures; and therefore in point of interest and gratitude cannot depart from it without being self-condemned.

The human Understanding as it is particularly exercised in the examination of an action by its proper rule is termed *Conscience*: In which exercise are implied three parts, *first*, the knowledge of the rule; *secondly*, the application of the action to it; *thirdly*, the judgment of the understanding pronounced concerning its agreement or disagreement.

These several acts are in many cases performed with so much quickness, that the interval between them is scarce discernable; just as the mind by a single glance at once apprehends a visible object, judges of its magnitude, and approves its beauty and proportion with an involuntary readiness. Hence this faculty is sometimes called *Moral Sense*; and occasion has been taken to speak of moral subjects in a language directly borrowed from sensible things, such as is imported in the words *Beauty, Order, Harmony, Proportion.*

Tho'

Though it be a good general rule for a man always to persist in acting according to the best of his judgment, yet, if due attention might have rectified that judgment, the error and misconduct consequent thereupon becomes justly imputable.

Erroneous Conscience does not always excuse, why not?

If the case be very uncertain in it self, and we happen to be under no authoritative obligation to act, it will be safest to forbear, 'till the difficulty is removed: This, at least in all ordinary cases, is within our power.

What is to be done in cases of difficulty.

This faculty of Conscience, we find, claims to it self the adjustment and correction of all other inward sentiments and affections, to allow or forbid their gratification: Nay, whether we consult it or no, it magisterially exerts it self, and approves some actions, consequent upon those affections, as right and of good desert, and condemns others, as wrong and of ill desert; and goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter second and confirm its own, and reward or punish us accordingly. Towards a third sort it is affected neither of these ways, but is quite indifferent.

Authority of Conscience.

In judging concerning the morality of actions, regard is to be had not meerly to the Substance of the action, the bare event or fact, but also, and principally, to the Circumstances

Actions considered as to their Substance, as to their Circumstances.

Circum-
stances are
what chiefly
determine
the moral
nature of
Actions.

of it. Though the taking away the life or property of others is generally wrong, yet those actions may be so circumstantiated as to become lawful; as, when the life of a Criminal is taken away in virtue of the sentence of a lawful Magistrate; or, when we secrete his sword from a man under the transport of anger, &c. On the other hand, Actions, that in the general carry the appearance of being indifferent, cease to be so by the concurrence of some particular circumstances; thus, Nothing is more common than for men to be abridged in the use of their natural liberty by the authority of the civil Magistrate. Rites and Ceremonies, however indifferent in themselves, cease to be so, when enjoyed by lawful Authority.

Enumera-
tion of the
several Cir-
cumstances
to be taken
into our ac-
count.

The several considerations to be taken into account, when we estimate the moral good or evil of any action, are usually recited in this order (agreeably to an old *Latin* verse)

The *Person*, by whom; the *Object*, upon which; the *Place*, where; the *Means*, whereby; the *Motive*, or principle upon which; the *Manner*, in which; the *Time*, when the action is performed.

What re-
quisite is
required to
render ac-
tions mo-
rally Good,
or Evil?

If an action be defective in any one of those respects, it ceases to be morally good; not that all Crimes are equal, but the degree in which such actions are morally evil is to be

be estimated not only from the number, but the importance, of those particulars in which they are defective.

Moral Virtue is usually spoken of as consisting in a *Mean* between two Extremes: Virtue consists in Mediocrity. Thus, true Courage is beset with Rashness on the one side, and Cowardice on the other.

It has been likewise observed that some Virtues are placed nearer, or bear more resemblance to one of the extremes than the other, Why some Virtues said to consist in Arithmetical, others in Geometrical mean? as Courage does to Rashness. Hence Writers in Ethicks have been induc'd to borrow a distinction from Mathematicks, and apply it to Moral Virtue. Commutative Justice they make to consist in the *Arithmetical Mean* (as 4 between 2 and 6); All other Virtues in the *Geometrical* (as 4 between 2 and 8). In both which cases the proportion is real; but in the former, the distance of the *Mean* from each *Extreme* is equal; in the latter, unequal.

And it must be confessed that as some men What foundation for placing Virtue in Mediocrity? are apt to fail in not coming up to the line of Virtue, so others by false zeal, impetuosity of temper &c. are found to overshoot it. But whether it be that with regard to some Virtues it is not common to find instances both of the excess and defect, or that Languages have failed in marking them out by peculiar names, we shall sometimes be at a loss to assign to every virtue two extremes. In

*Prudence
why intro-
duced a-
mong the
Virtues.*

In all cases, as has been observed, the moral goodness of an action depends upon the *Circumstances*, which attend the performance of it: How to judge of those circumstances is a matter of *Prudence*; and for that reason Moralists have introduced Prudence it self into the class of Virtues, as that which gives Being to all the rest; calling it however by way of distinction an *Intellectual* Virtue.

*an intelle-
ctual Vir-
tue.*

*Common
cases of Mo-
rality very
clear.*

As in speculative matters some propositions are so clear and evident, that the mind cannot refuse its assent to their truth; so in morals, we may be justly said to have a natural faculty to distinguish between Good and Evil. In most common ordinary cases of justice and charity, let any honest man, before he engages in a course of action, ask himself, Is this, I am going about, right or wrong? Is it Good or is it Evil? I doubt not but the question would be answered agreeably to truth and virtue.

*First
thoughts in
such cases
generally
best.*

In such cases to doubt and deliberate is dishonesty; It is often nothing but an endeavour to explain our duty away: By refining and raising difficulties about circumstances of bounds and degrees, men may, if they please, evade every moral obligation.

*But yet
care and di-
ligence are*

Not but that it is very possible for men either by prejudice, custom, false honour &c.

to

to impose upon themselves wrong measures ^{requisite in} and standards of what is right and wrong ; ^{judging of} ^{Morality.} or, for want of proper information, or due attention to the circumstances of a particular case, to be mistaken in their application of it to the true standard. And therefore our Understanding stands in need of proper diligence in its cultivation no less with respect to Morality than other matters; and this intellectual virtue of Prudence, like other habits, is to be acquired by frequent exercise, by exact thinking and careful consideration. However, let it be remembered, that *Prudence* is by no ^{The true notion of} means the same with meer speculative discern- ^{Prudence,} ment of what ought to determine the actions of a wise man; It implies moreover a due concern that we are not mistaken, the recollecting and putting our selves upon our guard against false appearances of reason and happiness, and forming practical resolutions to act suitably to our mature convictions. *Folly, Folly.* on the other hand, tho' it generally arises from a certain shallowness of understanding, is not meer incapacity to judge between right and wrong behaviour: But it is a thoughtless want of attention to what is reasonable, and a dissolute negligence in regulating our selves with a view to it; which, in a Being constituted as Man is, cannot fail of being immoral in a high degree.

CHAP. VII.

*Virtue
what.*

VIRTUE consists in an habitual regard to what is reasonable, right, and good in all our actions. It does not necessarily imply an actual accomplishment thereof: But it is sufficient, if we exert our best and sincerest endeavours (for instance) to accomplish all the good we can, to All with whom we have to do, in the degree and manner which the different relations we stand in to them require: and so on the other hand, We are blameworthy not only for the ill we do, but which we intended to have done, had it been in our power.

*In what
sense fol-
lowing Na-
ture.*

Virtue is sometimes said to consist in following Nature: Vice in deviating from it. *viz.* The nature of man is plainly adapted to a certain course of action: Upon comparing actions with this nature, some appear unsuitable and disproportionate, as, Parricide; others suitable and correspondent, as, filial Piety. Is a man a Father? a view of the relation, which he bears to his children, will inform him that his proper virtue is to take care of, to educate, and make due provision for them. Is he a Governour? --- to protect those who are under his authority. Has he received favours? --- to be grateful to his Benefactor. Has he favours

favours to bestow? he will shew himself more virtuous by bestowing them upon the indigent, than upon those who have no occasion for his assistance, &c.

What is requisite to denominate any single action good or virtuous has already been explained. Virtue, as above defined, is considered as applicable to the Person rather than his Action, thereby constituting what we call his Character. Now, inasmuch as the exercise of good actions is generally attended with some temptation to the contrary, and consequently with some difficulty to be overcome, the frequent performance of good actions is generally necessary to reconcile the affections, to form the heart and temper to a love and liking of what is good, and to secure us in the constant pursuit of it throughout the course of our behaviour. Nay, actions materially virtuous, which have no sort of difficulty, being (I suppose) perfectly agreeable to our particular inclinations, may yet have a tendency to form and fix the habit of Virtue within us, if the principle of virtue be at all exercised. But when the exercise of this principle is more continued, oftner repeated, and more intense, as it must be in circumstances of danger, temptation and difficulty of any kind, and in any degree, this tendency is increased proportionably,

Virtue of Actions, - of Persons.

Habit of Virtue how acquired.

Difficulties and Dangers productive of it.

E

tionably, and a more confirmed habit is the consequence.

*Division of
Virtue ac-
cording to
to the Ob-
jects.*

This Character may be considered in different views, and as exerted in different ways towards different objects: with regard to God we call it *Piety*; with regard to other men, *Probity*; with regard to a man's self, *Temperance*. --- To determine what is each man's particular duty, as such, and how the general rules of morality are to be applied in cases of some peculiar difficulty is the proper province of *Casuiſtry*.

*Casuiſtry
what?*

Piety what?

Piety is the habit of behaving dutifully and reverently towards Almighty God. It comprehends all those affections of mind, which are immediately due to God from such a Creature as Man, and which rest in Him as their end.

*God tho'
simple yet
conceived
by different
attributes.*

*- is the ob-
ject of dif-
ferent Af-
fections.*

Tho' God be in himself one uniform Being, simply one and for ever the same, yet He is and must necessarily be the object of different affections to us Creatures, who cannot but consider Him in partial and different views: and His several excellencies may be considered as objects of contemplation distinct from each other.

*Natural
idea of
God.*

Goodness we call the proper character of God, with wisdom to direct it and power to exert it; fixt, steady, equally unmoved by weak

weak pity, or more weak fury and resentment ; forming the justest scheme of conduct ; going on undisturbed in the execution of it, thro' the several methods of severity and reward, towards the general happiness of his Creatures.

Superior excellencies of any kind, particularly His power and wisdom and justice, especially as our Reason evinces Him to be always present with us, are the object of *Awe* and *Reverence* ; His goodness already exercised towards us, our present dependence upon him, and not only this, but our expectations of future benefits ought, and have a natural tendency, to raise in us the affections of *Affiance*, *Gratitude* and *Love* towards Him.

Awe and Reverence what Attributes they respect.

Love,

The imperfection of our virtue joined with the consideration of His absolute Rectitude and Holiness will scarce permit that perfection of Love which intirely casts out all *Fear*, *Fear*, the Fear of His Displeasure ; yet the consciousness of a real endeavour to approve ourselves to Him, joined with the consideration of His goodness, as it excludes all servile dread and horror, so it is plainly a reasonable ground for *Hope* of His favour. *Resignation* to the Divine Will is a temper of mind made up of the foregoing, and will necessarily be produced by

Hope, Resignation,

our having just conceptions of God, and a due sense of His Authority and Our state of Dependence: and hence will naturally arise a
Obedience, constant *Attention* to obey His commands, and
Joy. the highest *enjoyment* in the consciousness of His favour and approbation.

Devotion
what.

Devotion is the actual exercise of those affections towards God, which are supposed habitual in good men. Hereby at proper seasons we withdraw our selves from the avocations of sense, and yield our selves up to the influence of the Divine Presence, and give full
its exercise, scope to the affections of Gratitude, Love, Reverence, Trust, and Dependence; we *pray* unto Him for the relief of our Wants, and *thankfully acknowledge* the Blessings we have already received.

External
exercise of
Devotion.

Wherever there is this inward Veneration of God, it will naturally exert and testify it self to Others by such *external* services and actions, as by the consent of mankind have been judged proper expressions thereof, such as kneeling, &c. And this will be accompanied with a hearty zeal and indignation against all such things as reflect dishonour upon Him. Indeed Divine Worship, as it is in it self absolutely due to God, so also is it necessary to a further end, to keep alive upon our minds
its necessity. a sense of his Authority, a sense that in our
 ordi-

ordinary behaviour amongst men, we act under him as our Governour and Judge.

The two opposites to Piety are *Prophane-ness* and *Superstition*. *Prophaneness* is the reverse of what I have been describing. *Superstition* imports a frightful and over-timorous notion of God; representing Him as austere and rigorous, easily provoked by every little circumstantial mistake, and as easily appeased again by any flattering and slight formalities.

Extremes of Piety, Prophane-ness, Superstition.

CHAP. VIII.

WE see sufficient evidence in the very constitution of Man's nature to convince us, that he is not left to act at random: His nature is adapted to attain his own happiness, and to promote that of others. And this is reason sufficient to believe, that God, the Author of Nature, intended it for those purposes. His Conscience approves of and gives attestation to such a course of Action as is agreeable thereto; and the best security of preserving to Conscience its full authority, and consequently of persevering in a course of Virtue, is to live under the habitual reverence of God.

From considering the Constitution of Human nature we are led to know our Duty.

Piety the best security of Moral Virtue,

Whoever considers the whole commerce of Human Life will see that a great part of the inter-

necessary for that purpose. Why?

intercourse amongst men cannot be reduced to fixed determinate rules. Yet in most cases there is certainly a right and a wrong ; (for instance) a merciful, liberal, kind, and compassionate behaviour, which surely is our Duty ; and an unmerciful, contracted spirit, an hard and oppressive course of action, which is most certainly immoral and vicious. What written Law can here define so precisely, wherein a contracted spirit and hard usage of others doth consist, that we shall say in all cases where rigid right and justice end, and oppression begins ? It is certain therefore, that some such superior principle, as that of Piety, is requisite to influence our moral conduct, and to prevent that prevarication, with which we might otherwise be led to impose upon our selves, and to elude the censure of others.

*Justice
what ?*

*All Vir-
tues redu-
cible to it,*

*Universal
Justice.*

Justice consists in the habitual inclination to give every one his due. According to which account most other virtues might be considered as so many branches of Justice : For Piety is rendering what is due unto God ; Temperance is but a debt of justice to Our selves ; and charitable Relief is due to the poor and needy, &c. Justice considered in this manner is called *Universal Justice*.

Par-

Particular Justice may be considered either ^{*Particular Justice.*} as regulating the behaviour of Equals one towards another, or of Superiours towards Inferiours.

Of the first sort are the Duties, which we may in strictness exact of all other Men, such as, the not doing any injury; the making good a damage done to us, &c. So that it excludes not only the more gross and shocking acts of injury, such as Theft, Adultery, Murder, &c. but also all kind of Deceit in the management of business, all Contempt, Scorn, Neglect, any sort of disagreeable behaviour towards a person, other than what is due to him.

That branch of *Particular Justice*, which takes place in Contracts, as in Buying and Selling, Lending and Borrowing, Exchanging and Bartering, is called *Commutative Justice*; ^{*Commutative.*} which requires that the things or actions, which we exhibit to another in virtue of a reciprocal compact, should be answered by somewhat exactly of the same value in moral estimation.

Particular Justice considered in the second view is to be judged of according to the nature of those different Societies of which men are members: and it may be described in general to consist in a *Distribution* of the pro- ^{*Distributive.*} per

per share of the Goods of a Society to each member, according to the value of the Pains and Charges employed by him towards the preservation of it, in proportion to the pains or charges contributed by others: And so likewise the Burthens of the Society are to be distributed according to the benefits received from the Society by this or that man, in proportion to the advantages, which the rest of the members enjoy.

Injustice.

Injustice is, either when we do any Evil to another, which we had no right to do, or, when we take from another, or deny him any Good which he possesses, or had a fair title to require.

Injury.

When this is done studiously and industriously to another unconsenting and unprovoking, with intention and deliberate design of hurting or vexing, it is properly an *Injury*. Detriment occasioned to another by our Negligence is likewise injurious. But harm done casually in ignorance and unwillingly is only

Misfortune. a Misfortune.

Inasmuch as men are extremely prone to deceive themselves, and judge too favourably in every respect, where themselves and their own interests are concerned, we cannot too earnestly endeavour to suppress that partial, that false Self-love, which is the weakness of

our

our Nature; and for this purpose should frequently have recourse to the following rule,

"Substitute Your self in the room of another, when you consider what is proper and fit for you to do upon any occasion; imagining Your self to be the person affected by such and such a behaviour; and then you will not only see, but also feel the reasonableness or unreasonableness of it." --- There is an apprehension and presentiment, natural to mankind, that we our selves shall one time or other be dealt with as we deal with others; and we have a peculiar acquiescence in such a distribution. -- In short, Reason and Conscience are the measure of *Equity*, as Contracts and Agreements are of strict *Right*.

Rule to secure our observance of Justice.

Fortitude is a virtue disposing us to a right conduct with regard to the dangers and difficulties of life; so as neither on the one hand to betray our selves and our happiness by unreasonable *Fear*, or *Effeminacy* and *Softness*; nor, on the other, to throw our selves in the way of unnecessary evils and dangers by *Rashness*.

Fortitude what?

is extremes.

As to evils which threaten us at a distance, true *Fortitude* will preserve the mind in a due temper and readiness to make a proper use of such expedients as prudence may offer, in order to ward off the blow, or prevent the mischief of it. This is proper *Fortitude*.

Its exercise as to future Evils which are avoidable,

F

If

- as to present, or unavoidable.

Patience.

Fortitude not restrain'd to any particular profession, or bodily qualifications.

Contentedness.

If the evil be present or unavoidable, it animates the mind not to sink under its weight, but to bend it self to those circumstances which it finds to be not in its power to alter; not to aggravate its uneasiness by fretfulness, nor to seek relief by doing any thing contrary to right reason. This is *Patience*.

The object of Fortitude is by no means confined to military dangers: But all the evils of life, pain, poverty, disgrace, &c. all the allurements of unlawful pleasure and profit afford ample scope for the exercise of this virtue, to all degrees of men, whatever be the difference of their natural abilities, strength, activity, &c. So that every man, who exerts himself, according to his abilities, and the subjects and occasions in which he is conversant, is *Brave*, or has the virtue of *Fortitude*.

To this may be added the virtue of *Contentedness*, which does not consist in divesting our selves of all inclinations for what we do not enjoy at present; but in not indulging any beyond the probability of success: It does not forbid us making use of all our endeavours to preserve any happiness, that we are possessed of; but keeps us from being too fond of any, that we are in danger of losing: It does not tie us down to our present condition; but prepares us, if it is a good one,

for

for all the changes that may happen in it ; and teaches us, if it is a bad one, to bear it well as long as it lasts.

Temperance is that virtue, whereby we are led to regulate our selves in the indulgence of our sensual appetites. *Temperance*
what ?

GOD hath suited different objects to our several bodily appetites and desires : These have all of them their stint and bound ; beyond which if we carry our enjoyments, and give our selves up, either to the loose pleasures of *Sensuality*, or to the brutishness of *Gluttony*, or to the mad sallies of *intemperate Drinking*, we shall certainly disappoint and hurt our selves : Each of these vices directly tends to render us contemptible in private life, and unfit to be trusted in publick ; they cloud the understanding and stupify the judgment ; they dissipate our fortunes ; and dispose us to a general neglect of the duties which we owe our friends, our families, and our country ; and withal bring on an untimely old age with a long train of infirmities and diseases, rarely felt by the Chaste and Temperate. *Sensuality*;
Intemperance, their
folly.

Apathy on the other hand implys that something is amiss in our moral character ; inasmuch as thereby we become deaf to the calls of Nature to use the necessary means of our

Pleasure of preservation. --- Though it may be observed, that this case rarely happens.

It should be carefully remembered, that the pleasure, which naturally accompanies every gratification of our sensual appetite, was no more intended to put us upon gratifying our selves in every particular instance, than our Eyes, which are the instruments whereby we receive pleasure from visible objects, were given us to look against the Sun or such things, as are destructive of them.

*Abstinence
its use.*

Occasional Abstinence and Self-denial are of admirable use to subdue our appetites within the bounds which right reason has assigned them: In this view it may become our duty to suspend their gratification; as also it does, whenever the circumstances formerly mentioned do not all concur to recommend it; particularly the *kind*, the *quantity*, the *season*, the *manner* in which we take it.

*Self denial
when a
Duty?*

*Cardinal
Virtues
what?*

Justice, Fortitude and Temperance, together with *Prudence*, are sometimes called *Cardinal virtues*, as being the hinges on which our moral conduct is chiefly found to turn.

To these may be added several other virtues, which have an immediate respect to others, and serve to regulate our behaviour in such a manner as will be of benefit to our Fellow-Creatures.

Publick

Publick Spirit is a settled and reasonable *Publick Spirit* principle of Benevolence to human Society.

With regard to the bulk of mankind, it may with the utmost propriety be put upon the Love of our Neighbour, or of that part of human Society, which comes under our immediate notice acquaintance and influence.

Patriotism is an intire uniform love of ones *Patriotism* Country; and is properly applicable to men of publick stations, whose sphere of action is large, and extends as far as the whole Community to which they belong.

Friendship is a strong and habitual inclina- *Friendship* tion in two persons to promote the good and happiness of one another: The pleasures arising from it are generally too warmly felt for it to need any incitement or spur from argument; And the beneficial services which it administers, are a great temptation to contract it upon motives inconsistent with Truth and Justice.

Near a kin to which latter are the combina- *Party* tions of *Party*; which are often nothing else but a confederacy enter'd into upon the specious pretences of more effectually serving the Publick, and carried on with a main view to Self-interest by all the arts of Falshood and Dishonesty.

Compassion is a virtue leading us to mitigate *Compassion*, the calamities of other men, or to prevent them.

Compassion, them. It particularly singles out the unhappy, from whom can be expected no returns either of entertainment or future service, for the objects of its favour; it esteems the friendless condition of a man for a recommendation; it considers dejection and struggling through the world, and all those disadvantageous circumstances, which are usually thought a sufficient reason for neglect and overlooking a person, as a motive for relieving and helping him forward.

its extremes. It is possible indeed for this amiable affection of mind to rise so high beyond its just proportion, and to give so much uneasiness, as to incapacitate us from assisting those who are the objects of it. --- But the other extreme is more frequently to be met with, namely, *Insensibility* to the distresses and sorrows of our Fellow-Creatures.

Liberality, *Liberality* or *Bounty* consists in a free distribution of the materials and means of happiness, whether riches, kind offices, &c. This *its exercise how to be regulated.* Virtue, when rightly exercised, is carried forward and directed in several courses by particular regards to the nearness of relation, and the personal virtues of those whom we assist; and in different measure, as their wants and necessities require, and as our own abilities will allow of.

Libe-

Liberality in a Donor ought to excite *Gratitude* in the receiver; that is, a readiness to acknowledge and return a kindness received.

Frugality is a moderate affection to and pursuit of riches, in order to some good and useful end.

Money is the great instrument of commerce in civil Societies: In order to enable our selves therefore to come in for our reasonable share of civil happiness, and to provide for our families, and to exercise any rational act of Generosity, it is requisite that we learn both the value and use of money; that we extend our views forward, compute our income, and regulate our expences by it.

It is a vanity no less dangerous than ridiculous to act, as if Gentility consisted --- in suffering a man's self to be overreached and censur'd by all about him, --- in making a profusion of wealth, either promiscuous and undistinguish'd as to the occasion, or in a degree above his quality, rank and circumstances, --- in emulating at random every expensive instance of fashionable Diversions, Dress, Equipage, Hospitality, and Magnificence; that is in other words, in *Prodigality*.

The natural consequence thereof is a fall into all the evils of Poverty and Vileness, render'd still more insupportable by the remembrance

Use of Money to be learned. Why?

Prodigality described, not estimated by the sum expended, but by the occasion, rank and abilities of the spender.

Ill consequences of Prodigality.

*Ill conse-
quences of
Prodiga-
lity.*

brance of former Plenty and Esteem, and by the reflection that *Carelessness* and *Ill-husbandry* has deserved them all. Hence it is, that in order to supply his extravagances and to keep off the evil day of these calamities, we see the *Prodigal*, in opposition to his, once, better, and perhaps truly generous sense of things, abandoning himself to all the meannesses of a contracted Spirit; laying himself open to Corruption, oppressing his Dependants, defrauding his Creditors, and at length engaging in open acts of Outrage and Injustice.

*Covetous-
ness.*

Covetousness, on the other hand, is the immoderate desire and pursuit of riches for their own sake, or without a due regard to or consideration of the proper uses of them.

Industry,

Industry is the habit of application to some course of useful business and employment. Every condition of life affords scope for the exercise of this virtue; nor is any Fortune above, or can well subsist without it: For the advantages of life are not meerly offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition: and the powers of body and mind requisite for that purpose are found to be of little use unless improved by continual exercise.

*all men ob-
lig'd to it.*

Why?

*its exercise
relative to
the different
conditions
of men.*

The greater part of mankind are tied down to bodily labour to procure sustenance for themselves and their families: Others, who

are

are more at liberty from attending to these natural necessities, seem no less designed by Providence, than they are obliged by interest, to be serviceable to the Publick. As there is a particular education adapted to each particular employment, so there is a course of general discipline useful to all men; namely, the being put under good direction, and being inured to Application, Attention and Activity, in opposition to Listlessness, Remissness and Sloth. The former part of life therefore should be considered as an important opportunity put into our hands, to qualify us to go thro' the difficulties of mature Age, to procure such attainments of diligence and skill, as will fit us for serving our selves and our Country in some proper calling, trade, profession, or publick employment: which opportunity, if lost, is scarce ever to be retrieved.

Touch the proper season for attaining this habit.

The importance of improving this season rightly.

A virtuous industry is supposed to be the source of all the Hereditary Honours, which some persons enjoy above others: And in proportion as this excellency begins to fail, the Title will remain only to reproach the Bearer. --- Add to this, that the large train of Extravagance, Folly and Vice, which are the natural attendants upon the Idle man, cannot but impair that other security of His against disgrace, namely his Fortunes; and

Industry the main support of Honour.

G

there-

thereby make him as miserable, as he has suffered himself to become contemptible.

*Diversions
not inconsis-
tent with
Industry.*

But tho' this world was not intended to be a state of perfect ease and satisfaction, so neither was it to be a meer scene of toil and sorrow. God hath adapted several objects to give us delight, to serve as a diversion from the cares, the business, and the sorrows of life: these may be safely used under the direction of prudence. If no moral obligation be contradicted by our Mirth, Play, Amusements, &c. --- if we do not engage in those of a licentious and dissolute sort, which leave ill impressions upon the Mind; or which have a tendency to hurt our fortunes, and to lead us into the sordid unworthy arts of cheating, &c. --- if we do not spend so much time in them as to neglect the duties and offices of life, which belong to our station and condition in the world; in short, if there appears no inconsistency between them and our main end, (to which they may sometimes be made directly subservient) such gratification is certainly innocent. On the other hand, to make Diversion, Mirth and Jollity our business; to be constantly hurrying about after some gay Amusement, some new gratification of Sense or Appetite, is a most romantick scheme of life, and purchasing transitory entertainments

*How we
are to re-
gulate our
selves in the
use of them.*

at the expence of our wisdom and virtue and lasting happiness.

Modesty is a virtue which regulates our behaviour with regard to the good esteem of others. We are sociable creatures, and therefore we as naturally endeavour to avoid disgrace, neglect and contempt, as we do bodily pain; and desire to be the object of esteem and love, as much as we do any external goods.

Which affection of mind considered in the former respect is called a *Sense of Shame*, or an uneasiness upon the thought of having done any thing which will lessen the valued esteem which others have for us: which sense was no doubt implanted in us as a guard to our virtue, and as a bridle to restrain us from doing shameful actions: In the latter, it is called a *Sense of Honour*, which was intended to incite and spur us on to the prosecution of what is good and virtuous.

Honour is the external testimony of another man's good esteem: The proper and regular means of obtaining Honour is by employing and exerting our selves in whatever things are excellent; and especially in things beneficial to men: for Honour is a tribute or reward that is paid by men: and the value of it rises or falls in proportion to the supposed worth

and wisdom of those by whom it is conferred.

Ambition. The desire of Honour is called *Ambition*.

Emulation. *Emulation* is the desire and hope of equality with or superiority over others, with whom

Envy. we compare our selves. *Envy* attempts to attain this equality or superiority by the means of bringing them down to or beneath its own level, instead of raising itself.

Ambition why commendable? Preeminence, Dignities and offices of Honour are not only useful, but absolutely necessary to the good government of the world; and without them there could be no peace, no order, no society, nor civil commerce amongst men: and therefore they are all of them the matter of a very laudable *Ambition*, provided they be gained honestly and used moderately. To be insensible of the calls to Honour therefore must argue a contempt of mankind, or a base neglect of Our selves. But, on the other hand, nothing is so dangerous to Society, because nothing is so apt to put men upon violating the rules of Justice, as an ill-regulated *Ambition*, eagerly bent upon forcing itself into Preeminence at all events: nothing is more ridiculous, than that secret vain complacency of mind, with which weak men sometimes think of setting themselves in a rank of dignity and honour above their neighbours, by appearing foremost in the use of

of a gaudy dress, best accomplished in trifles,
or most undaunted in vice.

Virtue has of course a self-satisfaction and
applause accompanying it : But, as our virtue
is imperfect, so this satisfaction and applause
should be proportionably check'd and mode-
rated by a constant sense of our imperfection.
And this is that *Humility*, which is adapted to *Humility*,
the present corrupted state of mankind, and as
much belongs to it as a perfect self-satisfaction
does to a state of innocence. To be humble <sup>the true no-
tion of it.</sup> therefore is not to deny our selves to be what
we are, but to conceive rightly of our selves ;
--- with regard to our station among created
Beings, raised much indeed above the common
level, but still infinitely beneath GOD ; --- with
regard to the advantages which we enjoy, as
indebted to Him for them all ; --- and also
short of that perfection and integrity, which
might be expected from the due use of those
faculties which He hath given us. *Pride*, on *Pride*.
the other hand, consists in too high an esteem
for our selves, and the good qualities, or things
which we possess. As false notions of Humi-
lity are apt to overwhelm men with unrea-
nable confusion and *abjection*, which disables *Abjection*.
them from attempting what is great and glo-
rious ; so Pride or Arrogance, while it as-
sumes and attributes to itself more than is
due,

due, is the parent of rash undertakings, of haughtiness and insolence, of scorn and disdain towards those whom we think beneath us.

*Meekness
what?*

Meekness is a virtue particularly exercised in regulating the Passion of Anger. It implies in it a good degree of what we call easiness of temper, a freedom from mistrust, a disposition to believe well of our neighbour, a readiness to forego our right for the sake of peace, as well as in the way of compassion.

*Passion of
Anger why
implanted
in us?*

It is necessary for the very subsistence of the World, that injury, injustice and cruelty, villainy and baseness, should be prevented or punished; that disorderly behaviour should be corrected. These are the proper objects of Anger; the exercise whereof on a right object, and in a due proportion, is a generous and noble virtue, and one of the common bands by which Society is held together.

*The proper
objects of
Anger.*

Stupidity,

Lenity may be carried to a degree of *stupidity*, so far as to obstruct the execution of Justice to our selves and others: It then becomes a weakness and a fault on the one side.

Passion,

Passion is the common word for the other extreme: When this arises frequently and on small occasions, especially in languid tempers, it is called *Peevishness*. It shews itself differently in different men, according to the peculiarities of perverseness and wayward humour: some-

*Peevish-
ness.*

times

times flying out into open outrage, at others venting itself in ill language and hard words, that become no body either to receive or give; all the while keeping men uneasy in themselves, as well as making them so to all about them.

Anger or Resentment is usually distinguish-^{Defensive and Offensive}ed into *Defensive* and *Offensive*. Defensive re-^{five resent-}sentment, as it is designed to qualify us to^{ment.} resist and defeat sudden force, violence and^{Def. resent-}oppression, is always lawful. But inasmuch as^{ment al-}men are found to have naturally a greater^{ways law-}sensibility to, and are more deeply interested^{ful.} in whatever concerns themselves than others,^{Exercise of} and are thereby led to carry their resent-^{Offensive}ment too high for injuries done or intended^{resentment,} to themselves; for this reason, the exercise of^{why refer-}*Offensive* resentment in civil Societies is re-^{red to the}served to the civil Magistrate, as the more^{Magi-}likely person to proportion rightly his indig-^{strate?}nation to the particular ill action it is exer-
cised upon, and to answer the true ends of
punishments: And these are, either the amend-^{the proper}ment of the offender, or the removing the in-^{end of pun-}corrigible out of the way of being further^{ishments,} mischievous, or the intimidating others from
offending.

Resentment is by no means inconsistent^{Resentment} with good-will, for we see that truly affectio-^{not incon-}nate^{sistent with} good will.

nate Parents correct their Children. But if
Malice and ever Resentment comes to destroy good-will
Revenge intirely, and produces mischief for mischief
what? sake, it then is called *Malice* and *Revenge*, ---
 a vice which, if generally indulged, would soon
 propagate itself so as to lay waste the world.

Veracity, *Veracity*, taken in its largest extent, is the
 same with *Sincerity*, and signifies our shewing
 and appearing to be no other than we are in
 truth and reality : --- more properly, it relates
 to the strict regulation of what we say by the
 standard of Truth.

as opposed To appear worse than we really are is a
to Dissimu- most preposterous kind of Ambition, and very
lation and prejudicial to the cause of Virtue: To appear
Hypocrisy. better, may seem to be an excusable partiality
 towards ourselves.

Hypocrisy, But since mutual commerce between man
the evil in- and man subsists upon the presumption that
fluence of is such and such a course of action is naturally
upon mat- significative of a correspondent character and
ters of Com- disposition; were the instances of men's ap-
merce. peering in a false character to become fre-
 quent, that ground of confidence must neces-
 sarily be destroyed: and men would be dis-
 couraged in the performance of Social duties.
 It therefore is of great importance to Society,
 that the characters of men without faith and
 honesty should be known, in order to pre-
 vent

vent the innocent from being deceived or betray'd.

But with regard to vices properly personal, ^{Open Vice} considering the contagiousness of ill examples, ^{more detestable than} it were to be wished, that when men will not ^{Hypocrisy.} be perswaded to be really virtuous, they would at least not publickly act their vices: For of ^{Why?} the two characters, worthless as they are, the Hypocrite is less intolerable, less mischievous to Society, and in that respect less to be detested, than the openly vicious and prophane.

Let it be observed further, that when considerate men think it their duty to be diffident of their own sense of things, they may ^{Concealment of our Sentiments sometimes right.} fairly conceal it; and ill deserve to have their Moderation and Reserve branded with the odious names of Craft, Dissimulation and Hypocrisy. As ill does the contrary temper deserve to be encouraged under the notion of *Openness* and *Honesty*; while it is in truth no ^{False notions of openness and honesty.} other than usurping to itself a privilege of being headstrong and self-willed; of giving a loose to every passion that is uppermost; dealing out its censures or commendations according to every silly surmise of its own; and in consequence thereof exerting itself with such impetuosity, as, if others were to do the like, would render Society insupportable and the living in it impracticable.

H

The

*The ends of
Speech.*

The purpose of Speech is to communicate our thoughts to each other, *primarily*, for business and improvement; *secondarily*, for entertainment.

*Odiousness
of Falshood.*

As mankind are endued with Reason, or a capacity of distinguishing between Truth and Falshood, so are they naturally endued with Veracity, or a regard to Truth; hence is there a constant shame attending the perversion of this useful instrument of mutual intercourse in a man's self, and a strong abhorrence or contempt of it in others.

*Lying,
other vio-
lations of
Veracity.*

The highest disregard to Truth is seen in those who intend to deceive others, and for that purpose invent a *Lye* without any foundation at all. Criminal likewise is it in men to suffer themselves to be biassed and deceived through negligence or prejudice. In a considerable degree are they also to be blamed, who, however careful not to invent a *Lye*, yet propagate it with heightening circumstances, after it is invented and set a going. And, lastly, a degree, though a lower degree, of Falshood is it knowingly to let a *Lye* pass without contradiction.

*Unseasonable
dis-
course,*

They who wantonly disregard either the seasonableness, or the truth of what they say, both of them offend against this virtue, although no one be injured thereby: For it im-
plies

plies not only great folly and a trifling spirit, but great vitiousness of mind, great indifference to Truth, and to the welfare of others.

But when Talk becomes offensive to religion, virtue, good manners, tending to dissoluteness, slander, defamation, or divulging of secrets, it is a complicated crime, and falls under the censure due to impiety, injustice, malice, treachery, &c.

Add to this, that an extravagant disposition to *Ridicule* and *Drollery*, whether it be by accustoming our selves to make a mock at serious subjects, or by indulging a ludicrous turn in the abusive way of Raillery, is very incongruous in itself and pernicious in its consequences; the former having a tendency to pervert men's natural sense of good and evil; the latter being an unjustifiable insult upon the peace and quiet of our innocent Neighbour.

CHAP. IX.

BESIDES that course of behaviour which has already been referr'd to, and which on all hands is allowed to carry in the notion of it something morally virtuous and good, or morally vicious and evil, there are actions, which, however they come to be ranked under

*Indecency
of Beha-
viour.*

Decencies.

*their impor-
tance.*

*Some rules
of Decency
universally
the same,*

others local.

der no other general name than that of *Indecencies*, yet appear odious, and sometimes shocking to human nature; and are therefore what men are obliged to avoid in point of Morality and Virtue. What are called *Decencies* of behaviour, though they may seem to have no *particular* good tendency, yet are often found to have a *general* good one; they cherish in mankind a mutual reverence for each other; they more or less dispose men for the enjoyment of all the common blessings of life; and thereby promote humanity, friendship, good nature and civility: and on the other hand, the greatest Evils of social life often take their rise from somewhat of this kind, which was thought of too little importance to be attended to.

An approbation of some actions, and a dislike of others are found to be established throughout the world, by a secret and tacit consent; as in the instance of covering or disclosing some parts of the body. Other Actions are considered as decent or indecent, according to the fashion and custom of each particular country; thus, in some it is a mark of respect to uncover the head; in others, to cover it.

Under this class of excellences we may rank *Modesty* of deportment, *Affability*, *Good-breeding*,

breeding, and, which crowns all the rest, *Discretion*.

Modesty of deportment, as distinguished from *Modesty*, the Modesty above mentioned, (p. 51.) implies a diligent sollicitude not to give offence to others by our forwardness and disrespect; particularly with regard to our Superiours of any kind, in station, in years, in knowledge or experience. To be negligent of what others ^{in ex-} think of us, to have no restraint from, no re- ^{trema.} gard to others in our behaviour, is properly *Impudence*; and is commonly the forerunner *Impudence*. of debauchery, violence, and contempt of Laws. To refrain from doing what is just to our selves, or right in its own nature, for fear of displeasing others is *Sheepishness*; a weak- ^{Sheepish-} ^{ness.} ness particularly dangerous to Youth, betray- ing it contrary to its own desire and inclination to be hurried on by the worst of men to evil actions and places.

The just medium between both, especially with regard to such as are engaged in active life, may be called a becoming *Confidence*; not *Confidence*. conceited of its own worth, nor yet altogether insensible of it. This is requisite to give vigour and sprightliness to men's conduct, to prevent them from being overaw'd or baffl'd by Another's boldness; At the same time it leaves the Mind open to instruction, and the
Will

Will ready to submit to the direction of a better judgment.

Affability. *Affability* or *Courteousness* is a virtue which shews itself in an easy obliging manner of Address; in behaving towards all men, as far as we reasonably may, with gentleness and condescension; in a readiness to do them any act of Civility and ordinary kindness; and in putting a candid construction upon their words and actions.

Why reckon'd a moral Virtue.

Although this excellence in a great measure arises from a natural evenness of temper, and though the appearance of it in its best lustre is more especially owing to the happy opportunity of a liberal education; yet it certainly deserves a place among Moral virtues: Because it is right and reasonable in itself; --- the improvement of it into a habit requires care and diligence; --- and the extremes of it always denote something very wrong in our moral disposition.

its extremes,

These extremes are *Flattery* or *Fawning*, and *Moroseness*.

Flattery,

Flattery is observed to be no less indiscriminate than officious in testifying its approbation of the qualities and conduct of other men. --- This is sometimes owing to weakness and want of judgment; but more frequently to artifice and design; in which case it is a vice justly

justly odious for the mischief which it does, ^{odiousness} and particularly dangerous by reason of the ^{and danger} difficulty of guarding our selves against it. _{of it.}

It is the *Flatterer's* business to prey upon ^{Flatterer} the weakness or ignorance of others: Accord- _{described.} ingly with great pretence of kindness he thrusts himself upon the acquaintance, especially of great men. By borrowing Your humour he insinuates himself into Your affections; is the foremost to applaud You, especially in every act of Folly or Extravagance; and to make You jealous of every virtuous adviser: And having thus ingross'd Your confidence, he intrigues himself into Your business and prys into Your secrets; or intangles You in vice; and then masters Your purse, or else betrays and abuses You.

Moroseness, on the other hand, is a certain ^{Moroseness} furliness of behaviour, implying a determined resolution not to comply, nor to be pleased with any thing that is said or done by Others; equally censorious of their failings, and undervaluing their merits: Towards Superiours it shews itself in Restiveness and Disrespect; towards Equals, in Superciliousness and Rudeness; towards Inferiours, in Insolence and Domineering.

Good-breeding is the abovementioned virtue ^{Good} of Affability adapted to the innocent customs _{-breeding.} of

what is con-
sists in. of the Place in which we live, and to the particular dispositions of the Persons with whom we converse.

Civil lan-
guage.

Of this kind is the use of civil and respectful language in conversation, which certainly becomes all people : --- even where true love and respect are wanting, it is decent and of good example to avoid all unnecessary harshness and offensiveness in our expressions.

Demeanour
of Body.

Good-breeding also requires that we offend not another's sense or imagination by the use of our liberty ; --- that we do not abandon our selves to any such affected negligence, any such indecent postures or gestures of body, as betray our having a greater regard to our own ease than to the Persons with whom we are in company ; the solemnity of the Place ; or the seriousness of the Business in which we are engaged.

Ceremony
and Form,

Hereunto likewise may be referr'd the regulation of our exterior carriage and behaviour by the observance of *Ceremony* and *Form*.

Why
necessary?

--- 'Tis true these things considered by themselves appear quite indifferent ; but, upon the whole, they will be found so absolutely necessary, that without them neither Religion nor Morality could flourish in Society. If a due subordination of one condition to another be requisite to men's living in peace and order ;

order; for the same reason it is proper that Custom and Usage should mark out that distinction of Quality and Condition; which being done, it must argue some sort of weakness of judgment, or want of consideration, or great forwardness of temper, in any person to set up his own imagination against that of the Publick, and to take a pride in acting out of spite and opposition to established Fashion and Custom.

The same observation may be extended to *Habit* or *Dress*; both as to the *Matter* or Substance, and to the *Mode* or Fashion of it.

The Custom of all civilized Countries has regulated some general standard of Dress and Habit, as most convenient to discriminate people one from another, in point of Age and of Quality; to prevent all disrespect, disorder and confusion.

In this view, it is both inconvenient and indecent for men to affect a Garb and Dress unbefitting their condition. And as the judgment of the World is apt to set a mark of Lightness upon innovators therein; so in wise Communities this kind of Luxury hath been very justly restrained by penal Laws. For as Foppery of Dress is usually owing to an affectation of greater Superiority than is truly due to the wearers, and thus becomes the acci-

dental occasion of Pride ; so is it apt to withdraw them from more grave and serious objects, in which they might and should be better employed. And if it likewise carries men beyond their just and reasonable abilities ; --- if what should maintain them in necessities is trifled off in shew and gay appearance ; --- if exorbitant Debts are contracted to support this Vanity, it cannot (trifling as the occasion may appear) be reconciled with moral honesty.

*Foppery of-
ten immo-
ral. Why :*

*Rules of con-
duct in these
matters lia-
ble to be
mistaken,
and ridi-
culed.*

*Discretion
requisite to
give them
their due
efficacy.*

*Discretion,
what ?*

It may be observed in general, that rules of conduct, especially upon the matters last mentioned, though never so cautiously laid down, will be subject to misconstruction and mistake ; and consequently to Ridicule, from those, who are disposed to misrepresent them, or to animadvert upon the awkwardness or mis-carriages of such as fail in reducing them to Practice. For this reason, let men's sincerity and good intention be what it will, the excellency of *Discretion* is further requisite.

Discretion is the ability of behaving our selves prudently and decently on all occasions, towards all men ; so as to attain the end we aim at by means, not only just and righteous in themselves, but also well-approved and best liked by others ; to do what should and must be done, in the most becoming and acceptable manner.

With-

Without this the best of Virtues lose their ^{the great} power and efficacy in the world; ^{usefulness} that is, there ^{of it.} is no comparison betwixt the Good they do under a weak imprudent management, and what they would do, if wisely and discreetly ordered. Nor is it to be neglected in the smallest matters; it being that which gives Grace and Ornament to all that men say or do, and indeed which makes them conversable animals.

It is hard to tell how it is to be acquired; ^{deserves to} but yet the want of it is sensibly discerned on ^{be studied.} all occasions, and appears in all the Follies and Absurdities that people commit. It therefore ought to be studied much more carefully than it usually is; since every body is the better for it themselves, and the more serviceable to others.

CHAP. X.

THE great business of Virtue being to ^{Virtue, why} direct and controul the exercise of our ^{sometimes} several passions; and the greater part of these ^{said to be} depending upon, and borrowing the main part ^{Constitutional.} of their strength from the natural Temperament or Constitution of men's bodies; hence Virtue and Vice are sometimes spoken of as altogether constitutional.

*How far
so.*

And certain it is that the principles of all our passions and humours are born into the world with us, and that some Constitutions carry with them a natural incentive to the warmer and more active passions, of boldness, ambition, &c. Others give an indolent turn to our several faculties, rendering our passions cool and even; A third sort dispose the mind to levity, freedom and chearfulness; and A fourth to pertinaciousness, industry, thoughtfulness, &c.

These and several other Temperaments are combined in different degrees in different men; and according to that which bears sway above the rest and appears chiefly predominant, Naturalists usually give the denomination, and in common life we call the man so *temper'd*.

*Some Vices
National,*

*how account
ed for.*

It has been observed moreover that particular Vices are practis'd more frequently in some Countries than in others; which are therefore thought to be the peculiar and natural growth of the *Climate*; --- The air, diet, &c. which people use, have certainly great influence in altering the constitution of the Body; and this again by its close and intimate union gives a new turn to the inclinations of the Soul. Such propensities of human nature, being as it were mechanical, are not by any care or pains, by any art or diligence,

gence, to be quite extinguished: There will be evermore a tendency and bias to this or that side, as all men feel.

However, Natural Constitution can at most be said to contain the seeds of Vice; The growth of them up to a state of maturity, their producing mischievous and evil effects, depends upon our own negligence and mismanagement. On the other hand, we may with equal propriety be said to carry in our Constitutions the seeds of Virtue; which require care and diligence in order to their cultivation. So that the demerit of the former is justly chargeable upon us by way of guilt; and our improvement in virtue redounds to our praise and commendation.

Besides this of bodily constitution, which may properly be said to be seated in our nature, several other *external* circumstances might be mentioned, which are of great influence in forming men's moral character; such are Education, Company and Example, Course of life and Profession: These are found to give an imperceptible bias to our conduct, and serve indifferently either to correct and improve, or to vitiate and debase our natures: They severally open a different scene whereon our natural excellencies may be display'd to advantage; they afford occasions, circumstances and ob-

These considerations do not destroy the blameableness of Vice,

or, the commendableness of Virtue.

External circumstances influencing us to Virtue or Vice.

objects exciting our Passions, and means for gratifying them. And therefore it is a matter of mighty consequence to every man, in respect of moral attainments, what course of life, education, company and profession he engages in.

*Theory of
Virtue not
necessarily
productive
of virtuous
improve-
ments.*

To know our duty is no doubt a necessary step towards performing it: But to go over the Theory of it in our thoughts, to be able to talk well and to draw fine pictures of it, is far from necessarily or certainly conducing to form an habit of it in him, who thus employs himself; unless he at the same time inforces upon his mind a practical sense of it.

*Speculative
knowledge
however is
conducive to
the becom-
ing good.*

*namely, the
Knowledge
of our
selves.*

The ground-work upon which we may hope to proceed with success in that business is a serious endeavour to form just notions concerning the true nature and circumstances of our Being in its several parts, our *Soul* and *Body*; and concerning the duties which we owe to our selves in each respect, and the great consequence of discharging them aright.

And here we should consider how much our nature is raised above the low and grovelling state of the Brutes, and what great advantage is given us in our faculty of reasoning and recollection to subdue the irregular indulgence of our appetites.

It

It should further be considered how unquestionably little, as well as precarious, the pleasures and profits of Vice are at the best; and how soon they must be parted with at the longest. --- what inconveniences and sufferings they are apt to bring after them? what daily, what hourly disappointments, listlessness and satiety? They are naturally attended with some sort of uneasiness, and not uncommonly with great vexation and remorse; and above all with the natural presages of Conscience, that the just Governour of the World will fully testify His displeasure against Vice by the punishment of it in a future state.

On the other hand, Virtue and Innocence, as such, naturally procure several considerable advantages; such as are that inward security and peace, which keeps the mind open to the several gratifications of life; --- that complacency, satisfaction, and even joy of heart, which necessarily accompanies the real exercise of virtuous affections; --- that favour and friendliness which the generality of the world, and which good men especially, are apt to pay to a good character, so far as it is known. --- Add to this, that with regard to the restraints and confinement, which are often complained of, as attending a course of Virtue; whoever will consider the restraints from fear and

and shame, the dissimulation, the mean arts of concealment, and servile compliances, (one or other of which belong to almost every course of vice,) will soon be convinced, that the man of virtue is by no means upon a disadvantage in this respect; --- especially, when virtue is become habitual; when the temper of it is acquired, what was before confinement ceases to be so, and becomes choice and delight.

Virtue and Interest generally connected.

There is seldom any inconsistency between our Duty and what is *called* Interest: It is much seldomer that there is any inconsistency between what is *really* our present Interest; meaning by Interest, Happiness and Satisfaction. Self Love, though confined to the interest of the present World, does in general perfectly coincide with Virtue and leads us to one and the same course of life.

What is to be said to those instances where Virtue is confessedly unfortunate.

But whatever exceptions there are to this, (which are much fewer than they are commonly thought) all shall be set right at the final distribution of things; It being a manifest absurdity to suppose Evil finally prevailing over Good under the conduct and administration of a Being infinite in Wisdom, Goodness and Power.

These considerations enforce'd by seeing God before us.

As an inforcement to all this, it should be remembered, that we are acting in the view of

of a Being, in whose hands are the issues of ^{How?} Happiness and Misery; and who is in a much higher sense the object of Reverence and Love, than all the World besides: In which case no satisfaction could be taken from a wicked action done under His eye, comparable to that settled satisfaction of approving our selves to His unerring judgment.

These several principles of action, *viz.* a Re- ^{These several principles of Virtuous conduct all consistent with each other.} gard to God's Authority and Right over us, --- to the Excellence of Virtue, --- and to our own chief Interest, are not only all three co-incident, but each of them is in itself a just and natural motive. And that man who begins a good life from any one of them and perseveres in it, as he is already in some degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more and more of that character which is correspondent to the constitution of his nature as *Moral*; and to the relation in which he stands to God as his moral Governour and Lord; nor consequently can he fail of obtaining that happiness, which this Constitution and Relation necessarily suppose connected with that character.

But the entrance upon the practice of Vir- ^{Practice of Virtue not to be delay'd, nor to be suspended.} tue is a business which admits of no delay: it must be persisted in with resolution, with uniformity and steadiness. For the least volun-

Why?

tary indulgence in forbidden circumstances, though but in thought, will encrease a tendency towards what is wrong, 'till, peculiar conjunctures perhaps conspiring, we are drawn into an actual deviation from Virtue. And then we know not how much the first full overt-act of irregularity may disorder our inward constitution, unsettle the adjustments, and alter the proportions, in which the uprightness of our Make consists. Repetition of indulgences will go on to produce Habits, and corrupt us in our settled character, and render our passions excessive, proportionably to the repeated irregularities in occasional Acts.

*Danger of
Temptations.*

It should also be remembered, that in the case of habitual affections, or such as are most natural, whenever the objects are present to the Senses or offer themselves to the Mind, our Affections will be excited and make themselves felt, whether we will or no; not only before all consideration whether they can be gratified consistently with innocence and prudence, but after it is found that they cannot: In this case, the Affection, though its being excited, and its continuing some time in the mind be innocent, as far as it is natural, yet cannot but be conceived to have a tendency to incline us to venture upon unlawful means

to

to obtain them, and to put us in some danger of it.

It should therefore seem a necessary part of ^{Temptation to be avoided.} proper discipline and exercise for the strengthening and improving the principle of virtue, to avoid as much as may be all occasions naturally exciting ill propensions; and to divert ^{Caution & Discipline to be used.} our attention therefrom by diligent application to some useful business and employment. ^{Rules of Conduct for that purpose.} --- to accustom our appetites to stand restrained much within the bounds of what is strictly lawful.

--- to have a regard to the dangerous part of our character, our particular favourite Passion Interest or Pursuit; and to keep a steady eye over our selves in that respect.

--- to apprize our selves of the snares and temptations to vice, and to put our selves upon our guard against them; never to please our selves with the opportunities which we have, or imagine we have, of avoiding what we dislike, or of obtaining what we desire, by unlawful means, when we either cannot do it, or at least so easily, by lawful means.

--- to reflect often upon our Experience of the deceits of wickedness, and the infinite disorders in the world consequent upon its vitiousness.

--- to recollect the strong impressions once made upon us by the examples of those, who

*Rules of
Conduct.*

have in fact supported themselves, when all other enjoyments have failed them, with the satisfaction of a good conscience, the having made the pursuit of what is just and good the general bent of their mind and end of their life.

--- to heighten in our minds the love of virtue and abhorrence of vice by the perusal of serious and good books; and by applying to our selves those reproofs and instructions, which we meet with suitable to the state of our own mind, and the course of our behaviour.

--- to accustom our selves always in all matters in which we are engaged, be they greater or less, to act upon the principle of right Reason and Equity, instead of humour and mere inclination.

--- to have our regards frequently directed towards the final consequences of our behaviour, and that approaching period of our days, which must deprive us of all those advantages for which we sometimes prostitute our selves by Sin.

--- and, above all, to maintain constant intercourse with God our Guardian and Governour;

*Devotion a
great help
to moral
Virtue.*

and to cherish in our selves a sense of our dependence upon Him by daily Prayer. Here as in his more immediate presence should we bring

bring our moral concerns home to our selves by recollection and self-examination, review our conduct, and recover our selves out of that forgetfulness of our selves and our state, in which 'tis manifest the far greatest part of men are apt to pass away their whole lives. This will give great weight and efficacy to our endeavours to enforce good resolutions upon our minds, and also be a security against the turns and doubles of our heart, amidst the various temptations of the world, whether arising from the hurry of Business or the allurements of Pleasure. And this at last will be found to be the band whereby all Virtues are chain'd and knit together; inasmuch as whoever upon good principles observes to fulfill One, will seldom fail of discharging All: He will see the same reason and the same command of God for All as much as One.

Piety the band of Moral Virtues. Why?

All this is requisite supposing our selves *upright*; we should even then want to improve and raise our selves to a higher and more secure state of Virtue. But inasmuch as we are *depraved* Creatures, we want not only to be improved, but to be renewed; to wear out vicious habits and recover our strength of Self-Government.

The foregoing rules urg'd from the consideration of our being depraved Creatures.

In this view the light of *Christianity* is of singular use, as it has ascertained and given us

How Christianity improves upon Morality.

us a draught of that system of duties, which we call Natural Religion, in its genuine purity, and in so clear a manner as to approve itself, almost intuitively, to a reasonable mind upon seeing it proposed; --- as it has exemplified them in the life of our Saviour, --- and confirmed them by a new proof, the authoritative attestation of Miracles; --- and lastly, as it affords additional motives to the practice of them, by bringing to light the Doctrine of a future state of Rewards and Punishments; on the one side, it sets before us the danger of a course of wickedness, and on the other, encourages our endeavours after holiness and virtue, by giving full assurance of the efficacy of sincere Repentance.

*This not the
only end of
Christianity.*

But besides enforcing the practice of natural piety and virtue, Christianity has enlarged the scene and opened a prospect of many things new in the state of mankind, and in the government of the world: It has acquainted us with several relations, concerning which the voice of Natural Reason is altogether silent; and consequently has extended the rule of our Duty to several new particular objects.

*What is the
more immediate
subject of the
Christian
Revelation?*

For Christianity contains a revelation of a particular dispensation of things not at all discoverable by Reason, --- a dispensation of Providence carrying on by God the Son and the
Holy

Holy Ghost for the recovery and salvation of Mankind, who are represented in Holy Scripture to be in a state of Ruin; fallen from their original Rectitude, and degraded from their primitive Happiness.

And in consequence of this Revelation being made, several obligations of duty, unknown before, are revealed, --- Means are expressly appointed for obtaining the benefits of that reconciliation, which our Saviour made for us unto God the *Father* by his death, and of that assistance of the *Holy Ghost*, which is necessary to renew our nature in the degree requisite for our being qualified for that state, which *Christ* is gone to prepare for his Disciples.

The truth of Christianity being supposed, (and the direct proof of it is drawn from the Miracles wrought and Prophecies fulfilled in its confirmation) it is evident at first sight that it cannot in any wise be an indifferent matter, whether we obey or disobey those commands: *for instance*, The obligation we are under of paying religious regards, such as religious reverence, honour, love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope, to God the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, as well as to the *Father*, is an obligation of reason and is strictly moral; They all arise from the *respective relations* of Mediator, Sanctifier and Governour, which the three Persons

of

New duties revealed.

Means prescribed for the attainment of the end propos'd to mankind by the Christian Revelation.

In stating the Obligation to Christian Duties the truth of Christianity must be presuppos'd.

Direct proof of it whence to be drawn? Obligation to Christian Duties is strictly moral.

Why?

*Folly of ne-
glecting
them.*

of the Godhead stand in to mankind; and from the Offices, which appear, from Scripture, to belong to those Divine Persons in the Gospel-Dispensation, and not out of the *manner* in which we are informed of them. There is therefore no reason to think, but that neglect of behaving suitably to those relations discovered by *Revelation* will be attended with the same kind of consequences under God's Government, as neglecting to behave suitably to any other relations made known to us by *Reason*. If the benefits of Christianity are worth the obtaining, it can be no slight or indifferent matter, whether we make use of the means expressly commanded by God for that purpose.

Thus are we brought to *Christianity*, whose scheme or system of Doctrines and Morals, or Duties thence arising, can be learnt only from the *Holy Scriptures*.



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- On particular prophecies. Bp *Chandler*, 8vo.
- For a defence of the Gospel-Revelation placed in a com-
pendious view, see Bp *Gibson's* three *Pastoral Letters*.
- Scripture evidence sufficient to make men religious. Dr
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A TA-

A T A B L E

Of several of the principal Writers in Moral Philosophy.

MR *Locke*, when desired to draw out a system of Ethicks, delivered it as his opinion, that "the Gospel contains so perfect a Body of Ethicks, that Reason may be excused from that enquiry, since she may find Man's duty clearer and easier in Revelation than in her self." Vol. 3. p. 546. And the other great Philosophers of our Country, Laymen as well as Clergymen, such as the Hon. Mr *Boyle* and Sr *Is. Newton*, (to mention no other) have both by their writings and example recommended the study of the *Holy Scriptures*, particularly the Books of the *New Testament*, as incomparably the most instructive. And as to the Books of the *Old Testament*, they are (abstracted from the consideration of their divine Authority) no less superiour to the writings of meer human composition, in point of intrinsic Excellence than they are in Antiquity. *Moses* died about 1456 years before *Christ*: With what perspicuity and force are the great lessons of Morality taught and urged in the Book of *Deuteronomy*? --- *David*, the inspired penman of the greater part of the Book of *Psalms*, died about 1019 before *Christ*. Where is the whole Compass of Devotion, in the several forms of Confession, Petition, Supplication, Thanksgiving, Vows and Praises, so punctually taught or so warmly recommended as in the Book of *Psalms*? --- *Solomon* died before *Christ* about 980. Where are the rules of Wisdom and Prudence so convincingly laid down as in the Book of *Proverbs* and *Ecclesiastes*? (See the Moral, Political and Oeconomical precepts therein contain'd, judiciously methodiz'd by Dr *Jos. Hall* Bp of *Norwich*.) The most antient Prophetical writer is supposed to be *Jonah*, who prophesied 832 years before *Christ*; *Joel* 813; *Amos* 791, and so on to *Malachi* the last of them, who prophesied before *Christ* 404. Where is vice and impiety of all kinds more justly display'd and more fully confuted than in their threats and admonitions? Where

Where do we meet with a more just idea of the duties of Natural Religion, --- with more elevated and noble sentiments concerning the power and majesty of God, --- with more devout expressions of that submission and resignation which is due to His will, --- and of that joy of heart which arises from the testimony of a good conscience, than in the ancient Book of *Job*? --- To these may be added the fine moral reflections, which occur in the Apocryphal Books of *Wisdom* and *Ecclesiasticus*; the latter of which is supposed to have been wrote before 218 years before *Christ*.

Several of the wise sayings of the celebrated seven wise men of Greece, viz. *Thales* of Miletus; *Solon* of Salamis and Athens; *Periander* of Corinth; *Cleobulus* the Carian; *Chilon* of Lacedæmon; *Bias* of Priene; *Pittacus* of Mitylene; have been preserved. They lived about 600 years before *Christ*. --- *J. Fr. Buddæus* has drawn out and illustrated them in *Sapientia veterum*; hoc est, *dicta illustriora septem Græcia sapientum dissertationibus aliquot Academicis explicata*. Concerning these Wise men and their sayings, as also concerning the other Greek Writers hereafter to be mentioned, see *Stanley's* lives of the Philosophers, and *Fabricius's Bibliotheca Græca*.

Theognis of Megara, and *Phocylides* of Miletus were nearly contemporaries, and lived between 500 and 600 years before *Christ*. There are extant under the name of the former *ἑπτὰ λόγοι* or plain rules of life in elegiac verses; and an exhortation to virtue under the name of the latter in hexameters. But the genuineness of both pieces is much questioned.

Pythagoras died about 506 years before *Christ*. He delivered his moral philosophy in *Symbols*, or short proverbial sentences of an enigmatical kind; some of which are still extant. The *Golden verses* under his name are said to have been wrote by *Empedocles* about 60 years after. *Hierocles* a Platonick Philosopher, according to some in the third, according to others in the fifth century, wrote an ingenious commentary thereupon in Greek.

Some fragments of the *Pythagorean* Philosophers are found in the collections of *Stobæus*: see them publish'd in *Gale's opuscula*, Cant. 1671. 8vo.

Socrates of Athens made moral philosophy the subject of his familiar conversations: He left nothing in writing. He died before *Christ* 399.

Cebes

Cebes an auditor of his has left an ingenious draught of human life in his *Timæ*.

Of the writings of *Æschines*, another Scholar of Socrates, there are extant three dialogues, upon these subjects, *Utrum virtus doceri queat?* -- *Utrum divitiæ sint verum bonum?* -- *Utrum mors timeri debeat?*

Plato, another Scholar of Socrates, has delivered no regular draught of Morality; but has treated of several moral subjects in the following dialogues, viz. *De re publica*; L. 10. -- *De legibus*. L. 12. -- *Philebus de summo bono*. -- *Hipparchus de studio lucrandi*. -- *Charmides de temperantia*. -- *Lysis de amicitia*. -- *Protagoras de moribus sapientiæ professorum*. -- *Meno de virtute*. -- *Hippias major de honesto*. -- *Hippias minor de mendacio*. -- *Crito, ubi disquirat Socrates utrum se morte eximeret pretio ab amicis soluto*. -- *Phædo de animæ immortalitate*. -- *Alcibiades primus de naturâ hominis*. -- *Alcibiades secundus de prece*. He died before *Christ* 348.

Xenophon, another Scholar of Socrates, is supposed in his *Απομνημονεύματα* to have given a truer draught of Socrates's notions in morality, and his method of treating it, than *Plato*. He died before *Christ* 360.

Aristoteles, a Scholar of *Plato*, wrote three regular treatises of *Êthicks*, one intitled by the name of his son *Nicomachus* in ten books; which is most esteemed. The principles thereof are repeated in his *Magna Moralia*, L. 2. and in those addressed to *Eudemus*, L. 7. To these may be added his treatises *de Republica*, L. 8. and *Oeconomica*, L. 2. He died before *Christ* 322.

Theophrastus, a Scholar first of *Plato* and afterwards of *Aristotle*, has left a draught of several moral characters.

Epictetus lived about A. D. 90. His *Enchiridion* contains a masterly sketch of what is called the *Stoick Philosophy*. This piece was wrote by *Arrianus*, a constant Auditor and Scholar of his; who has likewise preserved many of his larger discourses upon moral subjects. *Simplicius* wrote an exegetical comment upon the *Enchiridion*.

Plutarchus died A. D. 120. He has wrote a great many pieces upon moral subjects, viz. *De auditione*. -- *Libellus quomodo quis suos in virtute paranda sentire possit profectus*. -- *De virtute & vitio*. -- *De consolatione ad uxorem suam*. -- *Et ad Apollonium*. -- *Commentarius, ne suaviter quidem viri posse secundum Epicuri decreta, docens*. -- *An vitiositas ad infelicitatem sufficiat*. -- *De amore prolis*. -- *De his qui sero à numine puniuntur*. -- *Virtutem doceri posse*. -- *De cohibenda ira*. -- *De curiositate*. -- *De tranquillitate*

quillitate animi. -- De vitioso pudore. -- De fraterno amore. -- De garrulitate. -- De cupiditate divitiarum. -- Animine an corporis affectiones sint deteriores. -- De virtute morali. -- De exilio. -- De invidia & odio.

Mar. Aurelius Antoninus Emperor of Rome died A.D. 178. He has left moral meditations in 12 books. (*Tho. Galtaker* in his learned commentary upon this Author has given a full account of the *Stoick Philosophy*.)

Maximus Tyrius, an eminent *Platonick* Philosopher, flourish'd about A. D. 170. He has elegantly digested his reflections upon several moral subjects in distinct dissertations.

Latin Writers.

M. T. Cicero died before *Chrif*t 33. Among his writings we have the following upon moral subjects. *De finibus* L. 5. in quibus disquiritur de summo bono summoque malo. -- *Tusculanarum Disputationum* L. 5. viz. de contemnendâ morte. -- de tolerando dolore. -- de ægritudine leniendâ. -- de reliquis animi perturbationibus. -- virtutem ad beate vivendum seipsâ esse contentam. -- *De legibus* L. 3. -- *De officiis* L. 3. -- *De senectute*. -- *De amicitia*. -- *Paradoxa Stoica*.

Publius Syrus lived soon after. His moral sentences in *Iambick* verse, short as they are, deserve mentioning for their elegance and smartness. --- as do the *Fables of Phædrus*.

Luc. Annaeus Seneca, sometime præceptor to *Nero*, died A.D. 65. His moral writings contain many noble sentiments, viz. *De ira* L. 3. -- 3 *consolationes*. -- *De providentiâ*. -- *De tranquillitate animi*. -- *De constantiâ sapientis*. -- *De clementiâ* L. 2. -- *De brevitate vitæ*. -- *De vitâ beatâ*. -- *De otio sapientis*. -- *De beneficiis* L. 7. -- *Epistola*.

Among the writings of the *Fathers* we have no regular treatise of morality; unless the Greek piece of *Clemens Alexandrinus* intitled *Pædagogus*, and the Latin one of *Ambrosius de Officiis*, are to be reckon'd of that sort. The former lived towards the end of the second Century; the latter, of the fourth. But there are none of the *Fathers* but what have, in their occasional treatises, sermons and epistles, enlarg'd upon moral subjects. Their integrity in deciding cases of conscience is allow'd on all hands: and their judiciousness in the main (I mean of the more able writers among them,) has been shewn by such learned men as have been well

acquainted with their writings, and consequently best qualified to judge in the case. (See *Dr Waterland's Importance of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, c. 7.) And if, (to use the words of *Dr Wotton, Reflect. on Learning*) at this distance, many of their decisions seem over-severe, there is as great at least, if not greater, reason to suspect that the complaints now adays raised against them may arise from our degeneracy, as from their unwarrantable strictness.

Boethius a Christian writer flourished about A. D. 510. He is said to have introduced the study of *Aristotle's* Philosophy into the Christian world; several of whose logical pieces he himself translated into Latin. He has left a large and elegant specimen of his skill in Moral Philosophy, in his treatise, *De consolatione Philosophiæ*, L. 5. wrote during his imprisonment, in prose and verse.

In the sixth Century *Isidorus Hispalensis* made a methodical collection of moral sentences out of the writings of the *Fathers*; particularly *Augustinus* and *Gregorius M.* This method of common-placing passages out of the *Fathers* grew into frequent use in the seventh and following Centuries, and laid the foundation of Systematical Divinity.

In the 12th Century *Petrus Lombardus* composed his system of Popish Divinity, intitled *Sententiæ*: which work quickly grew into such repute as to become a principal subject of the study and commentaries of Divines.

Accordingly *Thomas Aquinas* (who died A. D. 1274.) enlarged much upon the plan of *Lombardus*; as in other Theological points, so, particularly by the addition of a system of Ethicks in his *Secunda pars summæ Theologiæ*, which takes in the whole plan of *Aristotle's* Ethicks *ad Nicomachum*, with additions agreeable to the then received notions in Divinity, and is subdivided into two parts; the latter whereof (called *Secunda Secundæ*) treats of the several virtues and vices distinctly, and has been much admired. His manner is to consider every subject in several different views, starting objections and offering solutions.

And this method was chiefly followed by the succeeding tribe of scholastick writers.

Not that all writers in those ages confined themselves to the dry systematical way: witness that elegance of sentiment which appears in the moral treatises of *Petrarcha* in the 14th Century, particularly in the two books of Dialogues, *De remediis utriusque fortune*.

The

The Scholastick writers in morality were probably led to subtilize their matter so very much into curious and seemingly unnecessary questions, with a view to qualify Students in Divinity to solve cases of conscience, which might come before them at times of *Confession*.

(Mons. *Paschal* in his Provincial letters has exposed the principles of some Romish Casuists.)

It would be endless to enumerate the several writers in Ethicks upon the Aristotelick plan: I shall therefore only mention

Conr. Horneii *Philosophia moralis, sive civilis doctrinæ de moribus* L. 4.

Eustachii *Ethica*.

Philosophia Burgundiana.

Heerebord *Collegii Ethicum*.

Jac. Thomasi *Breviarium Ethicum Aristotelis*.

Ethicæ Compendium, Oxon. 1743.

Ethices Compendium in usum Juv. Acad. Oxon. 1745.

Of other writers who have not confined themselves to that plan, I mention

Pet. le Charron (Canon of Condom in France) his large and well digested treatise of Ethicks under the title *Of Wisdom*. The book is translated and corrected by Dr *Stanhope* in 3 V. 8vo.

Pet. Gassendus has drawn out a large treatise of moral Philosophy, fraught with citations from Poets and Philosophers, particularly the followers of *Epicurus*, of whom *Gassendus* was a profest admirer and advocate.

Abrah. Sculteti *Ethicorum* L. 2.

Barth. Kekermanni *systema Ethicum*.

Henr. Mori *Enchiridion Ethicum*.

Gottl. Heineccii *Elementa Philosophiæ moralis*, Amstel. 1740. 8vo.

Ethicæ Compendium, Glasgux 1742.

Of writers who have professedly taken the Christian doctrines of Morality into their account, see

Jo. Cirellii (i. e. Crellii) *Ethica Aristotelica ad sacrarum literarum normam emendata*. And

Ethica Epitome.

Dan. Whitby *Ethices Compendium*, Lond. 1724. 8vo.

J. F. Ostervald *Ethica Christiana*.

Ant. Walæi *Compendium Ethicæ Aristotelicæ ad Christianæ veritatis normam revocatum*.

To these may be added most of the modern systematical writers in Divinity.

Phil. Limborch Theologia Christiana L. 2 and 5.

Turretini Theologia Elenctica, Loc. undecimus.

The Whole Duty of Man.

Dr *Fiddes* Body of Divinity.

The several expositors of the Decalogue in our Church Catechism, particularly Dr *Hammond's* Practical Catechism.

I add, (tho' they treat only of some particular questions in moral Philosophy,) *Rob. Sanderson* Prælectiones de Conscientia & de Juramento.

Hugo Grotius was the first who reduc'd the Law of Nature and Nations into a regular system, in his treatise *de Jure Belli & Pacis*. It was first publish'd at Paris 1625. It has been often reprinted with various improvements, particularly by Mr *Barbeyrac*, 2 Vol 8vo. by whom 'tis translated into French. 'Tis publish'd likewise in English, fol.

Phil. Rein. Vitriarius publish'd an epitome of it intitled, *Institutiones juris naturæ & gentium*. --- so has

Jo. Scheffer in his *Grotius enucleatus*.

The great reputation obtain'd by *Grotius* thereby is said to have incited Mr *John Selden* to write his treatise, *De jure Naturæ & Gentium juxta disciplinam Hebræorum*. Lond. 1640,

J. Fr. Buddens has given a compendium of it, intitled *Synopsis juris Naturæ & Gentium*, &c.

Dr *Rich. Cumberland*, afterwards Bp of *Peterborough*, wrote his valuable treatise, *De Legibus Naturæ*, in opposition to the principles of *Thom. Hobbes*. Lond. 1672. -- 'Tis translated into English, with notes, &c. by Mr *Maxwell*, -- and lately publish'd in French, with notes, by Mr *Barbeyrac*. Amst. 1744.

Sam. Puffendorf's excellent work, *De jure Naturæ & Gentium*, was first publish'd 1672. 'Tis translated into English by Dr *Bas. Kennet* and others; to which translation are now annex'd Mr *Barbeyrac's* large notes: by which latter it was translated into French. Mr *Puffendorf* made a very useful abridgment of his own work, under the title *De Officio Hominis & Civis*; which has been translated into French by Mr *Barbeyrac*, and into English by Dr *Took*.

This smaller work of *Puffendorf* has been often publish'd with useful notes and commentaries, particularly by *Immanuel Weberus*, --- *Ev. Otto*, --- *Gottl. Gerh. Titius*, --- *Sam.*

TABLE II.

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-- *Sam. Treverus*, -- *Jo. Jac. Lehmannus*, &c. and lately
Mr *Th. Johnson*, Cantab.

The foregoing works of *Grotius*, *Cumberland* and *Puffendorf* have greatly contributed to the study of the Law of Nature and Nations, and given occasion to several learned treatises of morality abroad upon the same general plan, something diversified in particulars, such as,
J. Fr. Buddei Elementa Philosophiæ practicæ.
Gottl. Heinicci Elementa Juris Naturæ & Gentium.
Jo. Christ. Wolffii Philosophia moralis, 4to.

Among the English discourses I have already mention'd
Mr *Wollaston's* Religion of Nature delineated.
Bp *Butler's* Sermons, and Analogy.
Mr *Rutherford's* Essay on Virtue.
Mr *Hutcheson's* Enquiry, and his treatise on the Passions.
Mr *Balguy's* Letters and Tracts.

I am to add, Dr *Turnbull's* Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy, 2 Vol. 8vo.
Mr *Pope's* Essay on Man.

F I N I S.

Lately publish'd, by the same Author,

The Connection between Irreligion and Immorality. pr. 6d.

Also:

Reflections on the nature and usefulness of Logick, as it has been commonly taught in the Schools. pr. 6d.

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This image shows a blank, aged, cream-colored page, likely an endpaper or flyleaf of a book. The paper has a slightly textured appearance with some minor discoloration and faint creases, particularly a horizontal line near the top edge. There is no text or other markings on the page.

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 1, 1861. It is a copy of the original, and is signed by the President.

1907

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